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POLICING  THE  FIRM
D. Daniel Sokol*
ABSTRACT
Criminal price fixing cartels are a serious problem for consumers.  Car-
tels are hard both to find and punish.  Research into other kinds of corporate
wrongdoing suggests that enforcers should pay increased attention to incen-
tives within the firm to deter wrongdoing.  Thus far, antitrust scholarship
and policy have ignored this insight in the cartel context.  This Article sug-
gests how to improve antitrust enforcement by focusing enforcement efforts on
changing the incentives of internal firm compliance.
INTRODUCTION
In 2006, details began to emerge about a massive, decade-long,
worldwide price fixing conspiracy involving air cargo.  Seasoned inter-
national travelers will recognize members of the conspiracy, which
included some of the best-known airlines in the world—Air France-
KLM, Alitalia, American Airlines, British Airways, Cathay Pacific Air-
ways, Delta (via its acquisition of Northwest Airlines), Lufthansa, LAN,
El Al, Emirates Airlines, Singapore Airlines, Air India, All Nippon Air-
© 2013 D. Daniel Sokol.  Individuals and nonprofit institutions may reproduce
and distribute copies of this Article in any format at or below cost, for educational
purposes, so long as each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to the Notre
Dame Law Review, and includes this provision in the copyright notice.
* Associate Professor, University of Florida.  I wish to thank Charles Angelucci,
Joe Bauer, Anu Bradford, Peter Carstensen, John Donohue, Howie Erlanger, Harry
First, Brandon Garrett, Shubha Ghosh, Judge Douglas Ginsburg, Claire Hill, Louis
Kaplow, Al Klevorik, Bill Kovacic, Bob Lande, Brett McDonnell, Leslie Marx, Joe
Murphy, Richard Painter, Mitch Polinsky, Daniel Richman, Ewoud Sakkers, Steve
Shavell, Steven Schooner, Michael Seigel, Francis Shen, John Stinneford, Avishalom
Tor, and conference and workshop participants at the Catholic University of Chile,
Harvard Law School, George Washington Law School, University of Minnesota Law
School, NYU School of Law, Notre Dame Law School, Stanford Law School,
Washington University Law School, University of Wisconsin, and Yale Law School
(Harvard/Stanford/Yale Junior Faculty Forum) for their suggestions.  I also wish to
thank the students in Judge Ginsburg’s NYU corporate governance seminar for their
thoughtful comments.
785
786 notre dame law review [vol. 89:2
ways, South African Airways, and Thai Airlines.1  The extraordinary
dollar amount of this worldwide price fixing cartel (over $4 billion
recovered so far)2 has made the air cargo cartel the largest cartel in
terms of damages collected.
The number and sophistication of the companies and individuals
involved in this collusive criminal activity3 and lack of detection by
internal gatekeepers such as in-house counsel and compliance officers
illustrate inadequate corporate governance on a massive scale.
Employees of a given airline would send emails and phone their coun-
terparts across airlines to ensure that price changes, based on an
agreed upon fuel surcharge index, would be followed by all of the
cartel members.  These employees would report up to their superiors
that all the cartel members would increase the surcharge. Put differ-
ently, there were price conversations between competitors and some
bonding and monitoring mechanisms thereafter to enforce the
cartel.4
With all of the compliance enforcement methods used by anti-
trust agencies (imprisonment, individual and corporate fines, and
leniency), the number of antitrust agencies around the world spend-
ing resources to uncover cartels, and layers of compliance programs
within a given company, it may be surprising that so many large and
sophisticated companies avoided detection for ten years.  The cartel’s
duration and composition is even more shocking given significant cor-
porate governance focus on improving compliance.
Corporate scandals of the past decade have inspired burgeoning
academic literature on corporate governance and wrongdoing.  How-
ever, the explosion of scholarship on corporate governance and com-
1 See Air-Cargo Price Fixing Probed, CHI. TRIB. (Feb. 16, 2006), http://arti-
cles.chicagotribune.com/2006-02-16/business/0602160172_1_cargo-airlines-japan-
airlines-corp-surcharges.
2 John M. Connor, Multiple Prosecutions Point to Huge Damages from Auto-Parts Car-
tels 2 n.1 (Am. Antitrust Inst., Working Paper No. 12-06, 2012), available at http://
ssrn.com/abstract=2190200.
3 Parties to the various cases include over thirty airlines worldwide. See In re Air
Cargo Shipping Servs. Antitrust Litig., No. MD 06-1775(JG)(VVP), 2008 WL 5958061,
at *1 n.1 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 26, 2008) (listing the defendants in the First Consolidated
Amended Complaint).  There were multiple conspiracies across different countries
and a particular country’s market may have had a slightly different set of conspirators
than another country, such as between the conspiracy in the United States and the
conspiracy in the United Kingdom. Id. at *1.
4 Id. at *7 (“[A]ll thirty defendants, which range from airlines with enormous
fleets and broad reach to the national airlines of tiny countries, gathered or otherwise
communicated simultaneously, and thereby agreed to implement identical measures
in unrelated markets all over the world.”).
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pliance,5 as well as a similar increase in scholarship on white collar
crime and corporate criminality,6 has for the most part neglected
antitrust.
Cartels are a sophisticated form of corporate crime because they,
like other conspiracies, inherently require coordination across multi-
5 See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Dodd-Frank: Quack Federal Corporate Governance
Round II, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1779 (2011) (discussing Dodd-Frank’s corporate govern-
ance provisions); Lucian A. Bebchuk & Holger Spamann, Regulating Bankers’ Pay, 98
GEO. L.J. 247 (2010) (advocating for regulation of banks’ executive pay); Sanjai Bha-
gat et al., The Promise and Peril of Corporate Governance Indices, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1803
(2008) (analyzing corporate governance indices’ effectiveness); John C. Coffee, Jr.,
Law and the Market: The Impact of Enforcement, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 229 (2007); Frank H.
Easterbrook, The Race for the Bottom in Corporate Governance, 95 VA. L. REV. 685 (2009)
(examining various enforcement efforts); Jill E. Fisch, The Overstated Promise of Corpo-
rate Governance, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 923 (2010) (taking a critical approach to corporate
governance methods); Jesse E. Fried, Share Repurchases, Equity Issuances, and the Opti-
mal Design of Executive Pay, 89 TEX. L. REV. 1113 (2011) (criticizing calls to associate
executives’ pay with stock value); Claire Hill & Richard Painter, Compromised Fiducia-
ries: Conflicts of Interest in Government and Business, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1637 (2011) (dis-
cussing conflicts in corporate governance); Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Embattled
CEOs, 88 TEX. L. REV. 987 (2010) (arguing that CEOs are losing power to sharehold-
ers and their boards of directors); Jonathan Macey, Getting the Word Out About Fraud: A
Theoretical Analysis of Whistleblowing and Insider Trading, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1899 (2007)
(comparing whistleblowing to insider trading); Brett McDonnell & Daniel Schwarcz,
Regulatory Contrarians, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1629 (2011) (recognizing the role of authori-
ties critical of regulation); Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of
Quack Corporate Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521 (2005) (arguing that the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act was made in haste and requires change).
6 See, e.g., Jennifer Arlen, Corporate Criminal Liability: Theory and Evidence, in
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF CRIMINAL LAW 144 (Alon Harel & Keith
N. Hylton eds., 2012); Sara Sun Beale, A Response to the Critics of Corporate Criminal
Liability, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1481, 1482 (2009) (making a comparative examination
of other countries’ criminalization and advocating for criminalization); Pamela H.
Bucy, Why Punish? Trends in Corporate Criminal Prosecutions, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1287
(2007) (predicting that there will be more corporate criminal investigations but fewer
indictments of businesses); Samuel W. Buell, What Is Securities Fraud?, 61 DUKE L.J.
511, 512 (2011) (examining the meaning of “fraud” in the securities context);
Edward B. Diskant, Comparative Corporate Criminal Liability: Exploring the Uniquely Ameri-
can Doctrine Through Comparative Criminal Procedure, 118 YALE L.J. 126 (2008) (taking a
comparative law approach to criminal liability for corporations); Brandon L. Garrett,
Globalized Corporate Prosecutions, 97 VA. L. REV. 1775, 1777 (2011) (using case studies to
show a change in prosecutions); Michael L. Seigel, Corporate America Fights Back: The
Battle Over Waiver of the Attorney-Client Privilege, 49 B.C. L. REV. 1 (2008) (addressing the
conflict over the U.S. Department of Justice’s request for corporations to waive attor-
ney-client privilege); Drury D. Stevenson & Nicholas J. Wagoner, FCPA Sanctions: Too
Big to Debar?, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 775, 802–20 (2011) (arguing for the need to
increase debarment to deter foreign corruption).
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ple firms, as the air cargo cartel example illustrates.7  That the air
cargo cartel was not detected8 across its participant firms either inter-
nally or through third parties (customers and outside gatekeepers
such as law and accounting firms) suggests current antitrust criminal
and civil penalties are not sufficient to deter wrongdoing, nor is the
probability of detection sufficiently high.
Two major trends suggest that antitrust cartel enforcement is dif-
ferent relative to other areas of corporate crime.  First, in white collar
crime overall, there has been a shift toward more significant structural
penalties.  Brandon Garrett named this phenomenon “structural
reform prosecution,” a process in which prosecutors secure the coop-
eration of a business to adopt internal reforms.9  Similarly, Vik
Khanna and Timothy Dickinson have focused on the use of corporate
monitors (embedded outside oversight personnel) to increase firm
compliance.10  However, the systematic use of structural reform prose-
cution and monitors has been underutilized in the antitrust criminal
context, even when a corporate monitor has been imposed on a firm
that has committed other crimes, for example in the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act (FCPA) context, as well as antitrust violations.
The lack of systematic structural reform through monitors for
antitrust criminal price fixing seems surprising.  One might suspect
that the type of penalties imposed upon a firm would be more severe
for criminal antitrust than civil antitrust.  Indeed, in 2004 the
Supreme Court called cartels “the supreme evil of antitrust.”11 Yet, it is
generally civil rather than criminal antitrust that imposes corporate
monitors and compliance officers.
Second, the corporate and white collar crime literature offers
important governance lessons on the interaction of various internal
firm stakeholders—corporate boards, shareholders, senior and mid-
7 On the economics of coordination in cartels, see William E. Kovacic et al., Plus
Factors and Agreement in Antitrust Law, 110 MICH. L. REV. 393 (2011).  The economics
of cartels is not dissimilar to that of other sorts of criminal conspiracies. See, e.g.,
Nuno Garoupa, Optimal Law Enforcement and Criminal Organization, 63 J. ECON. BEHAV-
IOR & ORG. 461 (2007) (examining how to achieve optimal deterrence).
8 Detection means finding the cartel.  One could argue that it also includes that
people within the firm care enough to do something about it and have the power to
do something about it.
9 Brandon L. Garrett, Structural Reform Prosecution, 93 VA. L. REV. 853, 854
(2007).
10 Vikramaditya Khanna & Timothy L. Dickinson, The Corporate Monitor: The New
Corporate Czar?, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1713 (2007).
11 Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398,
408 (2004).
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level management.12  Yet, antitrust scholarship on cartels generally
has not recognized these insights.13  Instead, antitrust scholarship gen-
erally continues to see the firm as a “black box.”14
The present Article uses insights from economics, finance,
accounting, and management literatures to bridge gaps in antitrust
legal scholarship and offers a novel two-part proposal designed to
reduce cartel formation and increase detection of existing cartels.
The proposal provides incentives for firms to increase their
compliance.
The first proposal is to provide increased carrots for applicants
under the “leniency program” (no penalties from the Department of
Justice Antitrust Division (DOJ Antitrust))15 as a “super leniency” for
the cartel member that exposes the cartel and cooperates with DOJ
Antitrust (no penalties from DOJ Antitrust and no damages in private
litigation).  The second proposal involves increased sticks—the auto-
matic imposition of corporate monitors for all cartel members other
than the leniency applicant.  To make the case for the combination of
corporate monitors and antitrust’s use of leniency for cartels, this Arti-
cle explains: (a) what is currently done to punish cartels and why this
is not as effective as it needs to be, (b) how monitors work in other
contexts, and (c) how monitors and leniency would function to deter
and detect cartel activity in a criminal antitrust setting.
Properly designed, such a proposal would shift detection of
wrongdoing from government enforcers to firms and encourage firms
to spend more of their internal resources through more responsive
regulation.16  This would increase incentives for firms to self-report
12 In recent years, antitrust scholarship has started to explore how cartels work
internally. See Herbert Hovenkamp & Christopher R. Leslie, The Firm as Cartel Man-
ager, 64 VAND. L. REV. 813, 825–41 (2011) (describing cartel management); D. Daniel
Sokol, Cartels, Corporate Compliance, and What Practitioners Really Think About Enforce-
ment, 78 ANTITRUST L.J. 201 (2012) (providing survey evidence of antitrust lawyers on
the behavior of cartel clients).
13 See generally Louis Kaplow, An Economic Approach to Price Fixing, 77 ANTITRUST
L.J. 343 (2011) (providing a literature review on cartel scholarship).
14 Rosa M. Abrantes-Metz & D. Daniel Sokol, Antitrust Corporate Governance and
Compliance, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST ECONOMICS (Roger
D. Blair & D. Daniel Sokol eds., forthcoming 2014), available at http://papers.ssrn
.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2246564 (providing a literature review of compli-
ance and antitrust).
15 See infra Section II.A.  Though the Federal Trade Commission can bring civil
section 1 cases, this article focuses on DOJ Antitrust, which is the exclusive federal
antitrust enforcer of criminal antitrust.  Nearly all cases involve corporate leniency
rather than individual leniency, so this Article focuses on corporate-level leniency.
16 See generally IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION (1992)
(describing internal responsive regulation options which firms could take).
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illegal behavior.17  In those cases where cartels do form, the proposal
would help to reduce the corrupt culture both within each firm and
within the entire industry that might otherwise give rise to future car-
tel violations.
The remainder of the Article proceeds as follows.  Part I provides
an overview of cartel policy and the limits of its current enforcement
system.  Part II discusses super leniency as an alternative to traditional
leniency.  It also explores the lack of corporate monitors in antitrust
and asks why antitrust remedies do not resemble remedies in other
areas of corporate crime, with the routine imposition of monitors,
such as the FCPA.
Part III discusses the current use of monitors in civil antitrust
enforcement and how monitors might be used in criminal antitrust
enforcement.  This Part argues that super leniency and monitors
would improve deterrence and increase the incentive to defect from
existing cartels.
Given the use of monitors to change behavior in other antitrust
settings to protect consumers and promote compliance, this Article
argues that the most likely reason that criminal antitrust has not
embraced the use of monitors is the fear by DOJ Antitrust that some-
how tinkering with the leniency program will weaken the program.
The path dependency of the current DOJ Antitrust approach leads to
the use of ossified enforcement tools and techniques out of touch
with mechanisms elsewhere in white collar practice that make
enforcement more effective.  The Article concludes that super leni-
ency and monitors would move antitrust closer to optimal cartel
enforcement as compliance will become a strategic variable for firms.
I. THE COST OF CARTELS
Cartel activity is a significant and unambiguous loss to society,
which is why it receives per se illegal treatment (or something similar)
in most of the world.  From 2000 to 2010, the fines imposed against
cartels by government actions totaled $31 billion in the European
Union and $12 billion in the United States.18  Private actions against
17 Jennifer Arlen, The Failure of the Organizational Sentencing Guidelines, 66 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 321, 323 (2012)  (“Corporate criminal liability thus cannot serve its
central purpose unless it is structured to provide firms with strong incentives to detect
and self-report violations, as well as to cooperate with governmental authorities’
efforts to sanction individual wrongdoers.  Indeed, corporate sanctions undermine
the central purpose of corporate liability when firms face higher expected sanctions
when they engage in optimal corporate policing than when they do not.”).
18 John M. Connor, Cartels Portrayed: U.S. vs. EC: Who’s Winning the Prosecution
Race?:  A 21-Year Perspective, 1990 to 2010, at 29 (Am. Antitrust Inst., Working Paper
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cartels during this period (mostly in the United States) amounted to
an additional $41 billion.19
These figures do not offer context of how high the overcharge
(the amount charged above the competitive price) was for cartel vic-
tims.  For U.S. cartels, overcharges averaged between 18% and 37%.20
For European cartels, the range was between 28% and 54%.21  This
overcharge rate is under-inclusive globally as cartel members have the
ability to continue to reap supra-competitive profits in third-world
country markets that lack effective cartel enforcement.  In these other
countries, many of which are in the developing world, cartel members
often offset their fines from jurisdictions that impose them via higher
overcharges to their victims.22
Even with large fines for illegal activity, there is a significant prob-
lem of cartel detection, which suggests under-deterrence.  Scholars
have estimated the U.S. cartel detection rate between 13 and 17 per-
cent.23  This percentage has not changed even after the introduction
of the cartel leniency program, which provided for no penalties in
return for the leniency applicant to defect from the cartel and cooper-
ate with the authorities.24  Two recent papers on European cartels sug-
No. 11-03, 2011), available at http://www.antitrustinstitute.org/sites/default/files/
AAI%20Working%20Paper%20No.%2011-03.pdf; see also John M. Connor & Robert
H. Lande, Optimal Cartel Deterrence: An Empirical Comparison of Sanctions to
Overcharges (August 31, 2011) (unpublished manuscript), http://works.bepress
.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1005&context=robert_lande (analyzing the total,
combined impact of every existing anti-cartel sanction).
19 Connor, supra note 18, at 30.
20 John M. Connor & Robert H. Lande, The Size of Cartel Overcharges: Implications
for U.S. and EU Fining Policies, 51 ANTITRUST BULL. 983, 983 (2006).
21 Id.
22 See Julian L. Clarke & Simon J. Evenett, The Deterrent Effects of National Anticartel
Laws: Evidence from the International Vitamins Cartel, 48 ANTITRUST BULL. 689 (2003)
(detailing how the vitamins cartel was able to avoid the negative effects of enforce-
ment); Alvin K. Klevorick & Alan O. Sykes, United States Courts and the Optimal Deter-
rence of International Cartels: A Welfarist Perspective on Empagran, 3 J. COMPETITION L. &
ECON. 309 (2007) (discussing the vitamins cartel case).
23 Peter G. Bryant & E. Woodrow Eckard, Price Fixing: The Probability of Getting
Caught, 73 REV. ECON. & STAT. 531, 535 (1991) (analyzing the period between 1961
and 1988).
24 Alla Golub et al., The Probability of Price Fixing: Have Stronger Antitrust Sanc-
tions Deterred? 5 (Apr. 8, 2008) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://
ssrn.com/abstract=1188515 (providing a modern analysis).
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gest a detection rate range between 12.9% and 13.2%25 or
alternatively between 10% and 20%.26
Increasing the damage caused to consumers by cartels is cartel
durability.  The average duration of a cartel is five years.27  Yet, cartels
break up and reform with some frequency so that in some industries,
there is recurring cartel activity for decades.28
DOJ Antitrust claims that there is no cartel recidivism.29  In con-
trast, academic studies claim that recidivism may be significant.30  Har-
25 Emmanuel Combe et al., Cartels: The Probability of Getting Caught in the European
Union 17 (Bruges Eur. Econ. Research, Paper No. 12, 2008), available at http://www
.coleurop.be/content/studyprogrammes/eco/publications/BEER/BEER12.pdf.
26 Peter L. Ormosi, How Big Is a Tip of the Iceberg? A Parsimonious Way to Estimate
Cartel Detection Rate 21 (Ctr. for Competition Pol’y, Working Paper No. 11-6, 2011),
available at http://competitionpolicy.ac.uk/en_GB/c/document_library/get_file?uu
id=186cc0ec-a536-406d-9792-603f4f6ed95c&groupId=107435.  Estimates of activity
based on unobserved detection of behavior are something that many fields, such as
ecology and epidemiology address. See, e.g., HANDBOOK OF CAPTURE-RECAPTURE ANAL-
YSIS (Steven C. Amstrup et al. eds., 2005) (discussing this work in the context of
animal tagging).
27 Margaret C. Levenstein & Valerie Y. Suslow, What Determines Cartel Success?, 44 J.
ECON. LIT. 43, 44, 74 (2006) (providing a survey of the literature); see Andrew R. Dick,
When Are Cartels Stable Contracts?, 39 J.L. & ECON. 241 (1996) (investigating factors that
determine cartel life expectancy); Jaime Marquez, Life Expectancy of International Car-
tels: An Empirical Analysis, 9 REV. INDUS. ORG. 331 (1994) (calculating life expectancy
for cartels); Richard A. Posner, A Statistical Study of Antitrust Enforcement, 13 J.L. &
ECON. 365 (1970) (analyzing data from a number of agencies).  As a qualification to
the five year average, this average only may represent cartels that are detected and
prosecuted.  Moreover, the cartel may last longer than the time charged in the indict-
ment and unstable cartels may escape prosecution because they collapse earlier.  To
my knowledge, the current world champion for endurance is the Indo-Ceylon-Pakistan
Shipping Conference, which was established in 1875 and dissolved by the Competition
Commission of India in October 2008—a life of 134 years. See Nikhil Gupta, Competi-
tion Concerns in Shipping Conferences (research paper for Competition Commission of
India), available at http://cci.gov.in/images/media/ResearchReports/F2_LatestRe
visedFinalReportNikhil32_20080411102353.pdf.
28 See Margaret C. Levenstein & Valerie Y. Suslow, Breaking Up Is Hard To Do:
Determinants of Cartel Duration, 54 J.L. & ECON. 455 (2011) (discussing the relative
stability of cartels).
29 Gregory J. Werden et al., Recidivism Eliminated: Cartel Enforcement in the United
States Since 1999, 1 COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L ANTITRUST CHRON., Oct. 2011, at 6 (sug-
gesting that among those firms that have pled guilty to cartel crimes, these firms have
not subsequently pled guilty to another cartel crime thereafter).
30 Martin Carree et al., European Antitrust Policy 1957–2004: An Analysis of Commis-
sion Decisions, 36 REV. INDUST. ORG. 97, 117 (2010); John M. Connor, Recidivism
Revealed: Private International Cartels 1990–2009, 6 COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L. 101, 101
(2010); John M. Connor & C. Gustav Helmers, Statistics on Modern Private International
Cartels, 1990–2005, at 23 (Am. Antitrust Inst., Working Paper No. 07-01, 2007); availa-
ble at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=944039.  Recidivism may
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ding and Gibbs argue that there is an “awesome level of recidivism on
the part of major companies who appear as usual suspects in the world
of business cartels.  In short, this suggests a confirmed culture of busi-
ness delinquency.”31  Wils identifies a quarter of leniency applicants in
Europe as recidivists.32  Connor, using cross-country data, also sug-
gests cartel recidivism.33  Explaining high recidivism is the fact that a
firm may be better off financially for participation in a cartel even
after paying fines when caught.34
A. Limits to Optimal Deterrence
Optimal deterrence constitutes the basis for cartel enforcement.
The importance of an optimal regime is to “yield the ‘right’ amount
of compliance with legal rules—bearing in mind that enforcing these
duties is itself costly.”35  Deterrence is another way of asking whether
firms comply with the law and, if not, how to create an optimal com-
pliance-based system.  Becker, in his seminal article, suggested that
optimal deterrence is a function of the damages varying inversely with
probability of detection.36  Optimal deterrence makes the firm that
participates in illegal activity internalize the cost of crime.  Landes
extended Becker’s idea to antitrust.37 Given the pernicious effects of
cartels, low rates of detection, and insufficient penalties, it does not
seem that cartel enforcement globally has led to optimal deterrence.38
be higher than the numbers suggest.  Cartel members caught more than once may
just be the cartelists who are bad at colluding, or at hiding it.  There may be many
more recidivists about whom we do not know simply because these cartelists get smart
the second time around.
31 Christopher Harding & Alun Gibbs, Why Go to Court in Europe? An Analysis of
Cartel Appeals 1995–2004, 30 EUR. L. REV. 349, 369 (2005).
32 Wouter P.J. Wils, Recidivism in EU Antitrust Enforcement: A Legal and Economic
Analysis, 35 WORLD COMPETITION 5, 20 (2012).
33 Connor, supra note 30, at 101, 116.
34 Margaret Levenstein & Valerie Y. Suslow, Contemporary International Cartels and
Developing Countries: Economic Effects and Implications for Competition Policy, 71 ANTITRUST
L.J. 801, 801 (2004).
35 Reinier H. Kraakman, Corporate Liability Strategies and the Costs of Legal Controls,
93 YALE L.J. 857, 857–58 (1984).
36 Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON.
169 (1968). But see Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Role of Deterrence in the
Formulation of Criminal Law Rules: At Its Worst When Doing Its Best, 91 GEO. L.J. 949,
953–56 (2003) (explaining the problems with deterrence theory).
37 See generally William M. Landes, Optimal Sanctions for Antitrust, 50 U. CHI. L.
REV. 652 (1983) (describing how the lack of optimal deterrence causes firms to inter-
nalize the cost of crimes in antitrust cases).
38 To optimally deter firms against participating in cartels requires sufficient ceil-
ings for penalties. See Paolo Buccirossi & Giancarlo Spagnolo, Optimal Fines in the Era
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The optimal level of penalties is not the only factor to affect opti-
mal deterrence.  Optimal deterrence also requires consideration of
enforcement costs.  Such enforcement costs would include direct
costs of enforcement activities (the cost of the compliance program to
a firm, the cost of monitoring by government, private rights, etc.),
plus the cost of error (which deters socially valuable behavior).  More-
over, uncertainty in administrability may increase compliance costs.39
B. The Current Enforcement System
To deter cartel formation and participation, U.S. antitrust law
contains a mix of criminal and civil penalties for both firms and indi-
viduals under section 1 of the Sherman Act.40 Theory suggests that by
holding both individuals and corporations accountable, this mix of
punishment improves the probability of detection and leads to deter-
rence that is closer to optimal deterrence.41
The importance of criminal sanctions for firms is that it creates
some incentive for firms to monitor their agents.  Yet, because the
firm and its agents’ interests may differ due to agency costs, there are
also criminal penalties for individuals.
The mere threat of criminal sanctions is enough for nearly all
firms and individuals to settle with DOJ Antitrust through a plea
agreement.42  The extensive use of plea agreements is unlike other
of Whistleblowers: Should Price Fixers Still Go to Prison?, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF
ANTITRUST 81 (Vivek Ghosal & John Stennek eds., 2007) (discussing optimal fines).
Yet, penalties can be set too high.  Penalties that are too harsh may undermine opti-
mal deterrence. OFFICE OF FAIR TRADING, AN ASSESSMENT OF DISCRETIONARY PENALTIES
REGIMES 6 (2009) (“Higher fines can increase the cost of errors, may (in some situa-
tions) lead to insolvency and may not deter individual managers.”); Assaf Hamdani &
Alon Klement, Corporate Crime and Deterrence, 61 STAN. L. REV. 271, 276 (2008).  If
compliance costs are too high, then these extra costs of firms exiting the market will
be borne by consumers because of a higher marginal cost of production.  Bruce H.
Kobayashi, Antitrust, Agency, and Amnesty: An Economic Analysis of the Criminal Enforce-
ment of the Antitrust Laws Against Corporations, 69 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 715, 736 (2001).
39 Robert H. Lande, New Options for State Indirect Purchaser Legislation: Protecting the
Real Victims of Antitrust Violations, 61 ALA. L. REV. 447, 495 (2010) (suggesting this
concern as a Type III error).
40 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006 & Supp. V 2012).
41 Cindy R. Alexander & Mark A. Cohen, The Causes of Corporate Crime: An Eco-
nomic Perspective, in PROSECUTORS IN THE BOARDROOM 11, 33 (Anthony S. Barkow &
Rachel E. Barkow eds., 2011).
42 DEP’T OF JUST., ANTITRUST DIV. WORKLOAD STATISTICS FY 1999–2008 at 7, avail-
able at http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/files/doj-antitrust-division-workload-statis
tics—-fy-1999-to-fy-2008.pdf.
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areas of white collar crime, which rely more heavily on Deferred Pros-
ecution Agreements and Non-Prosecution Agreements.43
C. More Effective Punishment for Cartels in Antitrust
Most antitrust scholars suggest that increasing fines and jail time
will lead to optimal deterrence for cartels.44  This Article argues that
those traditional enforcement tools alone will not lead to significantly
improved enforcement.
The use of plea agreements45 is a low risk choice for DOJ Anti-
trust, which gets a “win” without the significant personnel expenditure
required for a fully litigated trial and without the risk of losing the
case.  DOJ Antitrust also counts every penalty, including the lightest
penalties, as a win, even when others might see such low penalties as a
loss.
The fact that nearly all antitrust cases end in a plea bargain exac-
erbates the tendency to have low levels of punishment.46  Plea agree-
ments mean less jail time than litigated cases.  Judges are wary of
imposing too much jail time or fines for economic crimes generally.47
Indeed, the lack of parity for sentencing of white collar crimes48 is one
of the reasons that Congress created the Sentencing Guidelines.49
43 Garrett, supra note 6, at 1822 (explaining DPAs, NPAs, and their uses).
44 See, e.g., Emmanuel Combe & Constance Monnier, Fines Against Hard Core Car-
tels in Europe: The Myth of Over Enforcement, 56 ANTITRUST BULL. 235 (2011); Massimo
Motta, On Cartel Deterrence and Fines in the European Union, 29 EUR. COMPETITION L.
REV. 209 (2008). But see Kobayashi, supra note 38, at 716 (arguing that there may
already be too much deterrence).
45 On plea agreements generally, see Oren Gazal-Ayal & Avishalom Tor, The Inno-
cence Effect, 62 DUKE L.J. 339, 341–45 (2012) (examining the prevailing scholarly views
on plea bargaining).
46 Ellen S. Podgor, White Collar Innocence: Irrelevant in the High Stakes Risk Game, 85
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 77, 85–86 (2010) (describing the impact of plea agreements on
corporate crime generally).
47 See, e.g., Sackett v. E.P.A., 622 F.3d 1139, 1142 (9th Cir. 2010) (listing the fac-
tors to be considered by courts in assessing the amount of a penalty for a violation of
the Clean Water Act), rev’d, 132 S. Ct. 1367 (2012); STANTON WHEELER ET AL., SITTING
IN JUDGMENT (1988).
48 See Kristy Holtfreter et al., Public Perceptions of White-Collar Crime and Punishment,
36 J. CRIM. JUSTICE 50, 51 (2008) (“[The public] still expects common offenders to be
sentenced more harshly.”).
49 U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, FIFTEEN YEARS OF GUIDELINES SENTENCING 15 (2004)
(“The Commission also sought to correct past under-punishment of crimes, such as
‘white collar’ crimes.”); see also Daniel Richman, Federal White Collar Sentencing in
the United States – A Work in Progress 2–4 (May 20, 2012) (unpublished manu-
script), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1999102
(discussing legislative history).
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Prison sentences seem to be effective in changing the deterrence
calculations for individuals within firms regarding cartel crimes.50
However, while jail time may affect an individual’s participation in a
cartel, it does not seem to significantly alter firm-level decision-mak-
ing.  This difference leads to a more fundamental point regarding
deterrence and the distinction between firm and individual: recent
reviews of the empirical scholarship suggest that jail is not as much a
deterrent for firms as seems to be popularly believed.51
Financial penalties for firms may be costly and affect firm deci-
sion-making.  One review of cartel scholarship finds that “at a funda-
mental level, the most important result [of the academic literature] is
that high fines are a crucially important element of deterrence.”52
Limiting the impact of high fines is that most cartel cases settle for
closer to single damages than treble damages.53  Thus, cartel fines
seem to be insufficient as a deterrent for cartels.54
High fines have limits as to effectiveness.  The literature on mar-
ginal deterrence suggests that increasing criminal sanctions in cartels
in particular will have far less effect than increasing the odds of
enforcement.55  Moreover, the private bar does not seem able to
50 Gregory J. Werden & Marilyn J. Simon, Why Price Fixers Should Go to Prison, 32
ANTITRUST BULL. 917, 935–36 (1987).
51 ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV., HARD CORE CARTELS: THIRD REPORT
ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 1998 COUNCIL RECOMMENDATION 27 (2005); Chris-
tine Parker, Criminal Cartel Sanctions and Compliance: The Gap Between Rhetoric and Real-
ity, in CRIMINALISING CARTELS 239, 239 (Caron Beaton-Wells & Ariel Ezrachi eds.,
2011).
52 OFFICE OF FAIR TRADING, supra note 38, at 8.
53 Robert H. Lande, Are Antitrust “Treble” Damages Really Single Damages?, 54 OHIO
ST. L.J. 115, 171 (1993); Robert H. Lande & Joshua P. Davis, Benefits From Private
Antitrust Enforcement: An Analysis of Forty Cases, 42 U.S.F. L. REV. 879, 883 (2008).
54 Joseph E. Harrington, Jr., Antitrust Enforcement, in 1 THE NEW PALGRAVE DIC-
TIONARY OF ECONOMICS 181 (Steven N. Durlauf & Lawrence E. Blume eds., 2008)
(concluding that, “financial penalties fall significantly short of making collusion
unprofitable”).  On the other end of the penalty spectrum, fines that are too high
may lead to bankruptcy of the firms in the market, which would result in a more
highly concentrated market and potential monopoly by the remaining firm.  Of
course, impact is also limited by the fact that the managers commit the crime, but the
shareholders pay the fines—and not even the holders at the time of the violation, but
those at the time the fine is imposed.
55 Christine Parker & Vibeke Lehmann Nielsen, Deterrence and the Impact of Calcu-
lative Thinking on Business Compliance with Competition and Consumer Regulation, 56 ANTI-
TRUST BULL. 377, 412–13 (2011) (describing the Australian compliance system and its
limits); Christine Parker, The “Compliance” Trap: The Moral Message in Responsive Regula-
tory Enforcement, 40 L. & SOC’Y REV. 591 (2006) (discussing situations where higher
penalties are rejected as being disproportionate for cartel crimes).  In the United
States, one might note that as the Federal Sentencing Guidelines are now merely
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detect cartels,56 so substituting private enforcement for public
enforcement57 probably will not work in the antitrust context.
Unlike other jurisdictions, the U.S. antitrust system does not use
additional forms of non-financial punishment to deter cartel activity.
These might include director disqualification (e.g., United King-
dom),58 whistleblowing rewards for individuals (e.g., South Korea),59
or something analogous to criminal sanctions for CEOs under the
Sarbanes-Oxley compliance certification60 to encourage greater anti-
trust compliance.
While the optimal magnitude of types of sanctions has been dis-
cussed in great detail, these discussions have not been a significant
part of the antitrust literature.61  The broader non-antitrust literature
suggests that many firms behave illegally and consider many factors in
advisory, judges are more able to act on any reluctance they may have to send “nice”
people to prison for “mere” white collar offenses.  Moreover, both judges and (to the
extent a case goes to trial) a jury might not be amenable to punish a mid-level execu-
tive for an offense that redounded to the benefit of the firm only and not the individ-
ual. Yet because Congress can change these limits (but chooses not to), the limits
should not be understood as structural limits.
56 Gregory J. Werden et al., Deterrence and Detection of Cartels: Using All the Tools and
Sanctions, 56 ANTITRUST BULL. 207, 224 (2011) (“Over ninety percent of fines imposed
for Sherman Act violations since 1996 can be traced to investigations assisted by leni-
ency applicants . . . .”).
57 Matthew D. McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, Congressional Oversight Overlooked:
Police Patrols Versus Fire Alarms, 28 AM. J. POL. SCI. 165, 176 (1984).
58 Douglas H. Ginsburg & Joshua D. Wright, Antitrust Sanctions, 6 COMPETITION
POL’Y INT’L 3, 3 (2010) (advocating for director disqualification in the United States);
Andreas Stephan, Disqualification Orders for Directors Involved in Cartels, 2 J. EUR. COMPE-
TITION L. & PRACTICE 529 (2011) (describing the U.K. experience with director dis-
qualification for cartels).
59 Ce´cile Aubert et al., The Impact of Leniency and Whistle-Blowing Programs on Car-
tels, 24 INT’L J. INDUST. ORG. 1241, 1254 (2006) (offering a theoretical model for
whistleblowing and cartel detection); D. Daniel Sokol, Detection and Compliance in Car-
tel Policy, 2 COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L ANTITRUST CHRON., Sep. 2011, at 5 (describing
the South Korean antitrust experience).  The bounty approach also has been tried in
the U.K. but with no success to date, largely because the bounty is quite small
(£100,000).  This literature on the appropriate use of the qui tam model is innovative
and very appealing conceptually but does not include a discussion in the model of an
appropriate filter by the antitrust authority to avoid frivolous or disgruntled employee
suits.  On the appropriate mix of incentives more generally, see Omri Ben-Shahar &
Anu Bradford, Reversible Rewards, 15 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 156 (2012).
60 Sokol, supra note 12, at 222 (advocating a similar approach in the antitrust
setting).
61 Kaplow, supra note 13, at 416–18.
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their decision to comply or not to comply, based on the relative costs
and benefits of compliance.62
Thus far, this Article has focused on firm level enforcement.
However, firm employees may have different incentives to comply
with antitrust law than does a firm itself.  Sometimes even if at the
board of directors’ level the firm wants to comply with antitrust law, its
agents may not.63
In other situations, both firm and individual have incentive not to
comply.64  Put differently, there is no agency cost for cartels because
both the firm and individual cartelists benefit from cartel participa-
tion in terms of profits and stock price increases, assuming no detec-
tion of the cartel and mere basic (legal but not strong) oversight from
the board.  Cartels may be similar to other areas of white collar crime,
such as bribery, in that, if wrongdoing goes undetected, both the indi-
vidual and the company benefit through higher shareholder value
(and individuals can justify their involvement as somehow saving jobs
in the company), because the harms are externalized.65  This is unlike
embezzlement or the internal misreporting of financial information,
where the individual’s actions unambiguously damage the firm long
term.  Improved incentives for compliance would change these
dynamics between firm and individual and increase agency costs as
they would align corporate incentives with good governance and legal-
ity.  Paradoxically, increasing agency costs is typically what corporate
governance strives to avoid.
Previous antitrust scholarship on the effectiveness of cartel com-
pliance in the United States suggests that antitrust compliance pro-
62 John Braithwaite & Toni Makkai, Testing an Expected Utility Model of Corporate
Deterrence, 25 L. & SOC’Y REV. 7 (1991); Eric Helland, The Enforcement of Pollution Con-
trol Laws: Inspections, Violations, and Self-Reporting, 80 REV. ECON. & STAT. 141 (1998).
63 Kaplow, supra note 13, at 417, 427. See generally Jennifer Arlen, The Potentially
Perverse Effects of Corporate Criminal Liability, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 833, 834 (1994) (“Corpo-
rate crimes are not committed by corporations; they are committed by agents of the
corporation.”); Barry D. Baysinger, Organization Theory and the Criminal Liability of
Organizations, 71 B.U. L. REV. 341, 355–60 (1991) (providing organizational theory
understandings of corporate crime); Patrick Bolton & Mathias Dewatripont, The Firm
as a Communication Network, 109 Q.J. ECON. 809, 813–37 (1994) (describing the inter-
nal network within the firm); Timothy F. Malloy, Regulating by Incentives: Myths, Models,
and Micromarkets, 80 TEX. L. REV. 531 (2002) (discussing the black box in the environ-
mental law context).
64 Sometimes there are differences between short-term and long-term incentives
of firms and their agents.
65 Marjo E. Siltaoja & Meri J. Vehkapera¨, Constructing Illegitimacy? Cartels and Cartel
Agreements in Finnish Business Media from Critical Discursive Perspective, 92 J. BUS. ETHICS
493, 500–01 (2010).
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grams are not effectively integrated within firm culture.66  Instead,
only a select group of managers understand the importance of anti-
trust compliance, whereas much of mid-level management and
employees do not seem sensitive to the importance of such compli-
ance generally, seem to forget their training, or seem insensitive to
the particular nuances of what types of collaboration among competi-
tors are illegal.67  Subsequent generations of employees and managers
get trained by their more senior colleagues in industry practices and
thereby pass on company and industry norms of non-compliance.68
Changing norms regarding cartels have important policy applica-
tions.  In other areas of corporate crime, a U.S. Attorney’s Office
might target a particular industry to change industry norms.  Cartel
enforcement, by its industry-level nature, allows for the possibility of
more effective norm changing at the industry level if there are appro-
priate incentives for detection and effective penalties.
This Article suggests an alternative approach to the one used by
DOJ Antitrust—one that creates different mechanisms to address the
root behavior that motivates illegality and that can change industry
norms (or is itself a product of bad norms).  This alternative would
create a set of incentives that better address the core problem of
improving detection.  The Article suggests better aligning of firm
incentives and organizational structures that otherwise lead to illegal-
ity within a given firm and industry.  This will change the traditional
approach to leniency as some firms may jockey for a better position to
defect from a cartel.69
66 Sokol, supra note 12, at 226–29.
67 Id.
68 Margaret C. Levenstein & Valerie Y. Suslow, Cartel Bargaining and Monitoring:
The Role of Information Sharing, in THE PROS AND CONS OF INFORMATION SHARING 43,
61–65 (Swedish Competition Auth. ed., 2006) (suggesting that trade associations in
the United States seem to have learned and changed the culture, while trade associa-
tions in Europe have not).
69 One could argue that perhaps cartel penalties should be increased to five-fold
or ten-fold of damages to get to optimal deterrence.  However, such proposals while
easy in theory are difficult to implement in practice due to significant pushback to a
substantial increase in penalties.  This is largely due to the history of excesses in pun-
ishment in antitrust and how courts have limited the scope of liability to address the
possibility of excessive liability. See Stephen Calkins, Summary Judgment, Motions to Dis-
miss, and Other Examples of Equilibrating Tendencies in the Antitrust System, 74 GEO. L.J.
1065, 1119–23 (1986).
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D. Lack of Incentives for Firms to Monitor
1. Compliance Incentives
It is costly to monitor firms for both obvious and non-obvious rea-
sons.  To understand this lack of effective monitoring, one must first
understand why firms should monitor their agents and the nature of
various organizational structures within the firm that may make moni-
toring costly.  The frustration of cartel policy is that firms seem unwill-
ing (or have rationally affirmatively decided not to) or do not believe
it is possible to take more effective steps against cartel behavior.
One aspect of the sometimes anemic cartel compliance efforts by
firms is that corporate law does not provide sufficient incentives to
create the sort of internal compliance process that may create effec-
tive compliance for antitrust.70  Empirical work on board liability
shows that in practice, there are limited financial penalties for weak
monitoring by the board.71  The lack of strong corporate compliance
mechanisms overall shapes the nature of firm-level compliance in anti-
trust and its limits.
The impact of corporate law on compliance also limits the effec-
tiveness of compliance codes.  Scholarship regarding the implementa-
tion of corporate codes of conduct post-Sarbanes-Oxley finds that
implementation has been mostly rhetorical.72
The nature of punishment of corporate crime explains, in part,
the paradox of why compliance (including antitrust compliance) is
not more effective.  Jennifer Arlen provides powerful insight into the
problem:
70 The present Article will not focus on the fiduciary duties owed to monitors and
what the appropriate role should be.  For such treatment, see Khanna & Dickinson,
supra note 10, at 1735–40 (discussing the types of fiduciary duties that a monitor may
have).  The current Article does, however, note that even some minimal compliance
may be better than no compliance. See James E. Gruber, The Impact of Male Work
Environments and Organizational Policies on Women’s Experiences of Sexual Harassment, 12
GENDER & SOC’Y 301, 304 (1998) (noting the role of compliance in the sexual harass-
ment setting).
71 Bernard Black et al., Outside Director Liability, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1055, 1064–74
(2006).
72 Lori Holder-Webb & Jeffrey Cohen, The Cut and Paste Society: Isomorphism in
Codes of Ethics, 107 J. BUS. ETHICS 485, 486 (2012); Kimberly D. Krawiec, Cosmetic Com-
pliance and the Failure of Negotiated Governance, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 487, 491–92 (2003);
Donald C. Langevoort, Monitoring: The Behavioral Economics of Corporate Compliance with
Law, 2002 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 71, 106 (“[T]he objective indicators of a values-based
program are also easy to mimic, making it difficult to separate out the sincere pro-
grams from the fakes.”).  Implementing codes of conduct and having an effective
compliance and ethics program may be two different things.  Just having a code, and
even having people sign it, can be close to meaningless.
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A firm that adopted an effective compliance program to detect
wrongdoing thereby increased the risk that the evidence it created
would be used to convict it if a crime occurred.  A firm that
reported wrongdoing could not do so without increasing its own
risk of being found criminally liable.  By contrast, a company that
turned a blind eye to the risk of crime, or even evidence of crime,
might avoid sanction altogether.  In addition, if the wrong was
detected, the firm would not be subject to any formal increased
sanction for not reporting or cooperating.73
Thus, firms have incentives not to undertake serious compliance.
Instead, inaction allows firms to reap the rewards of illegality (assum-
ing non-detection).74  Current antitrust enforcement therefore misses
a critical cause of the lack of effective anti-cartel compliance on the
part of firms.75
2. Corporate Law and Incentives
Shaping the incentives of compliance is the legal regime.  Under
Delaware law, the board of directors (rather than shareholders) is the
most significant unit of governance.76  Under current practice, firms
lack sufficient incentives to invest seriously in compliance programs.
Corporate boards under Delaware law have very weak legal duties to
monitor the firms’ actions, as the scope for violating such duties is
narrow.77
Caremark78 provided directors with greater oversight duties for
corporations, particularly a proactive obligation for oversight.  How-
ever, the case provided a relatively difficult threshold for finding liabil-
73 Jennifer Arlen, Removing Prosecutors from the Boardroom: Limiting Prosecutorial Dis-
cretion to Impose Structural Reforms, in PROSECUTORS IN THE BOARDROOM, supra note 41,
at 62, 72.
74 Even when there is detection, firms may behave strategically to shift the blame
of non-compliance to lower-level employees.  Garrett, supra note 9, at 876.
75 One might argue that antitrust is different from many other types of corporate
crime for another reason.  The corporate leniency program allows a firm to be the
leniency applicant for its cartel participation and leads to a total decrease in the cor-
porate sanction.  One might argue that this might solve the incentive problem.  How-
ever, as noted earlier, there are not sufficiently high sanctions to deter a significant
cartel behavior. See supra notes 23–34 and accompanying text.  Moreover, a company
might not qualify for leniency, e.g., because its employee “led” the conspiracy.
76 Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy and Shareholder Disempowerment, 119
HARV. L. REV. 1735, 1746 (2006).
77 Eric J. Pan, Rethinking the Board’s Duty to Monitor: A Critical Assessment of the Dela-
ware Doctrine, 38 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 209, 210 (2011).
78 In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 967–70 (Del. Ch.
1996) (discussing the oversight duty under Delaware law).
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ity for poor compliance.  Therefore, Caremark did not create sufficient
incentives for more effective corporate oversight.79  In Stone v. Ritter,
the Delaware Supreme Court interpreted the Caremark duty (based on
a duty of care) as a loyalty duty but nevertheless required a showing
“that the directors knew that they were not discharging their fiduciary
obligations.”80  Thus, it is very difficult to win a case based on an over-
sight claim.81
Given the high threshold for liability under Caremark, there
seems to be little incentive under Delaware law for a serious pro-active
compliance program beyond the minimum required under corporate
law.  The one exception to this set of incentives is that the scope of
liability, should a court find the board of directors to be liable, would
make the violation of corporate law for non-compliance non-exculpa-
ble.82  To the extent that price fixing decisions occur at the top, what
one has is really not a failure to monitor, but rather a knowing viola-
79 Jennifer Arlen, The Story of Allis-Chalmers, Caremark, and Stone; Directors’
Evolving Duty to Monitor, in CORPORATE LAW STORIES 323, 326–27 (J. Mark Ramseyer
ed., 2009).
80 Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 2006) (holding that liability exists when
the board “consciously failed to monitor or oversee its operations thus disabling
themselves from being informed of risks or problems requiring their attention”).  For
academic commentary, see Claire A. Hill & Brett H. McDonnell, Stone v. Ritter and
the Expanding Duty of Loyalty, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 1769 (2007).
81 Michael J. Borden, Of Outside Monitors and Inside Monitors: The Role of Journalists
in Caremark Litigation, 15 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 921, 925 (2013) (“Of the 248 cases brought
under Delaware law alleging Caremark-type violations, only fourteen times did the
Caremark claim survive the motion to dismiss.  Plaintiffs achieved an adjudication of
liability only once.”).
82 Corporate law can change the standard for the oversight duty but would do so
at the risk of creating another set of problems in terms of firm governance. DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2013).  If anything, Delaware is moving to applying the
Caremark standard in other contexts involving analysis of good faith. See, e.g.,
Lyondell Chem. Co. v. Ryan, 970 A.2d 235 (Del. 2009) (applying essentially the
Caremark standard in the transactional context).  On good faith generally, see Christo-
pher M. Bruner, Good Faith, State of Mind, and the Outer Boundaries of Director Liability in
Corporate Law, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1131 (2006) (discussing Delaware law); Claire
A. Hill & Brett H. McDonnell, Disney, Good Faith, and Structural Bias, 32 J. CORP. L.
833 (2007) (arguing for an clarifying two-part test for good faith analysis).  For exam-
ple, corporate law can return oversight as a function of a duty of care and good faith.
For an article that pushes the relationship of good faith and duties of care and loyalty,
see, Stephen M. Bainbridge, Caremark and Enterprise Risk Management, 34 J. CORP. L.
967 (2009).  Whether corporate law should create a different threshold for oversight
and whether fiduciary liability is too crude a tool is beyond the scope of this Article.
This Article only addresses a theory of second best: the antitrust impact of the current
system of corporate rules of liability.  Stephen M. Bainbridge, Unocal at 20: Director
Primacy in Corporate Takeovers, 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 769, 827 (2006) (explaining the
theory of second best in corporate law).  It may be easier to solve the problems in
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tion of the law.  That is quite different as a matter of corporate law—if
one can show a knowing violation, it is a straightforward (and non-
exculpable) violation of fiduciary duty.83  Yet, qualitative interviews on
cartel compliance suggest that in some cases, even senior officials do
not know that cartel activity is illegal (particularly Asian and European
executives) or think that fixing the actual price is illegal but do not
realize that something like coordinating among firms to set up territo-
rial or output restrictions is also illegal.84
Even if the antitrust violations occur at a lower level, so that one is
indeed talking about failures to monitor, one must be careful to dis-
tinguish two separate agency questions.  One is the agency problem
motivating the primary violator, the individual, discussed infra.85  The
other is the agency problem facing the board in devising a monitoring
system.  The problem is, why should we distrust the board’s decision
as to how to monitor antitrust violations if we have correctly set up the
penalty system for the organization as a whole?  The belief that the
board is well-positioned to decide how much monitoring is enough is
at the core of the defense for the extreme weakness of the Caremark
duty.  This problem can be addressed by changing the baseline for
best practices within a Caremark setting.  The government can respond
via a requirement to improve monitoring much the way that it did
regarding requiring that a majority of the board be made up of
outside directors where previously the board could be a majority of
corporate insiders.86
E. Culture of Corruption
Culture plays a role in understanding cartels as well as finding
methods to combat them.  There are a number of different ways in
which various incentives shape culture.  The following Section pro-
vides an overview of a number of different areas.  Some are based on
organizational factors, others on institutional factors, and yet others
based on larger societal factors.  This Section illustrates the diversity of
factors that shape a culture of corruption that allows for cartels to
flourish.
antitrust that result from the corporate governance problem rather than restructure
corporate law to expand liability for oversight cases.
83 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7).
84 Sokol, supra note 12, at 226–29.
85 See infra subsection I.E.2.c.
86 Tom C.W. Lin, The Corporate Governance of Iconic Executives, 87 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 351, 363 n.67 (2011).
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1. Understanding Culture and Its Impact on Firms and Industries
Incentives within the firm are strong factors in shaping the behav-
ior of the firm and its agents.  Thus, firm culture may create direct
incentives for criminality.87  For a cartel to avoid detection by a partici-
pating firm’s employees, there typically needs to be some level of man-
agement that actively participates in the cartel and other employees
who either are unaware of or turn a blind eye to such behavior.
Firm culture has both economic and socio-legal explanations.
Corporate crime is an agency cost.88  The foundational work on
agency costs by Jensen and Meckling modeled how agents might do
what is in their best interests rather than that of the firm without effec-
tive monitoring by the principal.89  Close monitoring can reduce this
divergence but might deter agents from risk-taking that might benefit
the firm.
Culture affects compliance both within an industry and within
individual firms.  In her book Controlling Unlawful Organizational
Behavior,90 sociologist Diane Vaughan proposed a causal model for
misconduct that includes the competitive environment (competition,
scarce resources, and norms), organization characteristics (structure,
processes, and transactions), and regulatory environment.  These fac-
tors taken together explain misconduct.
In her later work, The Challenger Launch Decision, Vaughan used
this same model to explain the space shuttle Challenger explosion.
The Challenger Launch Decision contained extensive data about organi-
zational processes.  The central concept that emerged was normaliza-
tion of organizational deviance.91  This normalization process
explained how non-compliance became part of the organizational
routine.
If we treat non-compliance as a form of misconduct, then this
model applies in the case of cartel compliance.  Gilbert Geis wrote a
classic article on the heavy electrical equipment price fixing cartel.  In
it, he quoted industry leaders who said that they committed no wrong-
doing because their activity was viewed as legitimate in the industry.
87 See generally ROBERT JACKALL, MORAL MAZES (1988).
88 Cindy R. Alexander & Mark A. Cohen, Why Do Corporations Become Criminals?
Ownership, Hidden Actions, and Crime as an Agency Cost, 5 J. CORP. FIN. 1, 2 (1999).
89 Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behav-
ior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 327–28 (1976).
90 DIANE VAUGHAN, CONTROLLING UNLAWFUL ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR chs. 4–6
(1985).
91 DIANE VAUGHAN, THE CHALLENGER LAUNCH DECISION 150–52 (1996).
2013] policing  the  firm 805
That is, executives in their view were conforming to, not breaking, the
rules.92
There are two sets of cultural factors that antitrust must consider
in tweaking the current cartel leniency model—firm-level and indus-
try-level factors.  A more effective cartel policy requires shaping and
responding to these organization characteristics.
2. Organizational Characteristics That Lead to Non-Compliance
Violations of antitrust law may occur because of organizational
failure (poor compliance mechanisms and incentives) rather than just
pure profit seeking on the part of senior management.93  From the
standpoint of organizational failure, to the extent that compliance is
weak, this will negatively affect the legitimacy of the program within
the firm.94
Organizational design issues that may contribute to illegality are
“processes and tasks, positional relationships, and hierarchical levels
and departmental boundaries.”95  As organizations increase in com-
plexity, firms develop various organizational structures in response.96
As this subsection will illustrate, there is no monolithic way to describe
a corporation’s culture.  A company adapts based on a number of fac-
tors and any remedy to a corrupt cartel culture needs to account for
this dynamic behavior due to culture.  This subsection provides an
overview of the dynamics that shape how compliance works based on a
number of factors to provide context for the discussion specific to
antitrust compliance and the various solutions this Article advocates.
92 See generally Gilbert Geis, The Heavy Electrical Equipment Antitrust Cases of 1961, in
WHITE-COLLAR CRIME 117 (Gilbert Geis & Robert F. Meier eds., 1977).
93 Alan R. Beckenstein & H. Landis Gabel, The Economics of Antitrust Compliance,
52 S. ECON. J. 673, 674 (1986).
94 See Tammy L. MacLean & Michael Behnam, The Dangers of Decoupling: The Rela-
tionship Between Compliance Programs, Legitimacy Perceptions, and Institutionalized Miscon-
duct, 53 ACAD. MGMT. J. 1499, 1501, 1515 (2010); Martin Ruef & W. Richard Scott, A
Multidimensional Model of Organizational Legitimacy: Hospital Survival in Changing Institu-
tional Environments, 43 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 877 (1998) (discussing hospitals’ internal opera-
tions and legitimacy); Gary R. Weaver et al., Integrated and Decoupled Corporate Social
Performance: Management Commitments, External Pressures, and Corporate Ethics Practices, 42
ACAD. MGMT. J. 539 (1999).
95 Jonathan Pinto et al., Corrupt Organizations or Organizations of Corrupt Individu-
als? Two Types of Organization-Level Corruption, 33 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 685, 695 (2008)
(citations omitted).
96 See generally MICHAEL L. TUSHMAN & CHARLES A. O’REILLY III, WINNING
THROUGH INNOVATION (2002).
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a. Size
Since the mid-1990s, close to half of criminal antitrust violations
targeted by DOJ Antitrust have involved international cartels.97  This
focus on large-firm international price fixing is important given that
the size of the firm affects its propensity for criminality.  Larger firms
are more prone to criminal behavior.98
Size may be a factor because, as organizations get larger, agency
costs increase and monitoring becomes more difficult.  Likewise, the
complexity of organizations may increase agency costs.99  The larger
and more complex an organizational structure, the more difficult it is
to coordinate various organizational subunits.  Because of organiza-
tional size and complexity, it is possible to hide significant wrongdo-
ing from government officials and inside and outside gatekeepers.
b. Structure
Organizational structure may affect firm culture.  A centralized
organization will be more likely to have a strong organizational cul-
ture than a decentralized organization that has subcultures within
departments or divisions.100  Centralization may reduce agency costs
because there may be better oversight.  Decentralization may be the
product of increased firm complexity, and complexity may increase
monitoring costs.
In some cases, the more complex the organization, the higher
the proclivity is for illegal activity.101  A unit within the firm (such as a
division) might have an incentive to improve a division’s profitability
even though much of the risk for the cost of wrongdoing might be
placed at the firm level.  Therefore, a decentralized structure
97 John M. Connor & Darren Bush, How to Block Cartel Formation and Price Fixing:
Using Extraterritorial Application of the Antitrust Laws as a Deterrence Mechanism, 112 PENN
ST. L. REV. 813, 813 n.1 (2008).
98 Melissa S. Baucus & Janet P. Near, Can Illegal Corporate Behavior Be Predicted? An
Event History Analysis, 34 ACAD. MGMT. J. 9, 14–15 (1991).
99 See OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, CORPORATE CONTROL AND BUSINESS BEHAVIOR
(1970); Ming-Jer Chen & Donald C. Hambrick, Speed, Stealth, and Selective Attack: How
Small Firms Differ from Large Firms in Competitive Behavior, 38 ACAD. MGMT. J. 453 (1995);
R. Preston McAfee & John McMillan, Organizational Diseconomies of Scale, 4 J. ECON. &
MGMT. STRATEGY 399 (1995); J. Myles Shaver & John M. Mezias, Diseconomies of Manag-
ing in Acquisitions: Evidence from Civil Lawsuits, 20 ORG. SCI. 206 (2009).
100 See LINDA K. TREVIN˜O & KATHERINE A. NELSON, MANAGING BUSINESS ETHICS 214
(5th ed. 2011).
101 Marie A. McKendall & John A. Wagner, III, Motive, Opportunity, Choice, and Cor-
porate Illegality, 8 ORG. SCI. 624, 627 (1997).
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increases the risk of development of unethical subcultures within an
organization.102
Given the link between organizational structure and wrongdoing,
it seems to be the case that the internal governance structure within a
corporation affects the likelihood of successfully monitoring illegal
behavior and enforcing compliance.  For example, the structure of
the board may impact outcomes.  Independent outside directors seem
to be more effective than inside directors (members of the firm’s
management team) at policing against corporate fraud103 and oppor-
tunistic grants of stock options.104  Specific to cartels, recent finance-
based work suggests that cartel-member firms tend to file an abnor-
mally large amount of financial restatements, have less effective moni-
toring due to foreign or busy (too many board positions) directors,
and are less likely to replace directors who resign.105
Illegal activity may become embedded in an organization over
time and become a part of organizational culture.106  Unethical
changes within an organization may be subtle and gradual, such that
individuals do not realize that they are engaging in illegal behavior.107
Over time, organizations reach a tipping point in their culture at
which illegality becomes a defining element of the organization itself.
This may lead to the “decoupling” of actual practice from various gen-
eralized compliance procedures because of the vagueness of the vari-
102 See Blake E. Ashforth & Fred Mael, Social Identity Theory and the Organization, 14
ACAD. MGMT. REV. 20, 28–29 (1989) (discussing organization and identification).
103 Mark S. Beasley, An Empirical Analysis of the Relation Between the Board of Director
Composition and Financial Statement Fraud, 71 ACCT. REV. 443, 443 (1996); Mark S. Beas-
ley et al., Fraudulent Financial Reporting: Consideration of Industry Traits and Corporate
Governance Mechanisms, 14 ACCT. HORIZONS 441, 450 (2000); Hatice Uzun et al., Board
Composition and Corporate Fraud, 60 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 33, 33 (2004).
104 Lucian A. Bebchuk et al., Lucky CEOs and Lucky Directors, 65 J. FIN. 2363, 2364
(2010).
105 Tanja Artiga Gonza´lez et al., Smokescreen: How Managers Behave When They Have
Something to Hide 4 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 18886, 2013),
available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w18886.
106 See Ruth V. Aguilera et al., Putting the S Back in Corporate Social Responsibility: A
Multilevel Theory of Social Change in Organizations, 32 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 836, 842 (2007)
(“[T]he moral actions of the firm interact with the moral concerns of employees in
influencing their behaviors within the organizational context.”); Kenneth Bet-
tenhausen & J. Keith Murnighan, The Emergence of Norms in Competitive Decision-Making
Groups, 30 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 350, 350 (1985) (describing how social norms are formed in
organizations); John Van Maanen & Edgar H. Schein, Toward a Theory of Organiza-
tional Socialization, 1 RES. ORG. BEHAV. 209 (1979).
107 Blake E. Ashforth & Vikas Anand, The Normalization of Corruption in Organiza-
tions, 25 RES. ORG. BEHAV. 1, 5–6 (2003).
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ous legal terms used for compliance or terms that omit important
elements.108
As this discussion of incentives, culture, and legitimacy109 sug-
gests, social norms play an important role in corporations.110  By
changing the corporate norm to an ethical standard through the use
of effective compliance management techniques and more effective
use of compliance programs, a compliance program increases the
probability of detection of illegal activity.111  Some firms have a strong
compliance culture because incentives have been put into place to
reward strong compliance.112  These incentives may take the form of
pay incentives, monitoring of the firm’s incentive structures, and
rewarding positive behavior through promotions.113  In addition to
incentives, culture is molded through other compliance techniques
such as organizational structures that allow for effective monitoring by
legal and compliance staff, appropriate discipline, including the disci-
plining of managers who fail to take steps to monitor their subordi-
nates, and practical communications, all of which lead to the overall
creation of pro-compliance corporate cultures.114  For other firms, the
social norms may work towards non-compliance for many of the same
reasons.  When individuals are rewarded for unlawful behavior, when
monitoring by compliance staff is not strong, or when country-level
and industry norms push toward cartel behavior, these norms may
reinforce the probability of cartel behavior.115
108 Kenneth A. Bamberger & Deirdre K. Mulligan, Privacy on the Books and on the
Ground, 63 STAN. L. REV. 247, 302–11 (2011); John W. Meyer & Brian Rowan, Institu-
tionalized Organizations: Formal Structure as Myth and Ceremony, 83 AM. J. SOC. 340,
340–41 (1977) (providing the classical formulation).
109 See generally TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (2006) (concluding that
people obey the law if they believe it is legitimate, not because they fear punishment).
110 Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Trust, Trustworthiness, and the Behavioral
Foundations of Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1735, 1809–10 (2001); Robert Cooter
& Melvin A. Eisenberg, Fairness, Character, and Efficiency in Firms, 149 U. PA. L. REV.
1717 (2001); Lisa M. Fairfax, The Rhetoric of Corporate Law: The Impact of Stakeholder
Rhetoric on Corporate Norms, 31 J. CORP. L. 675, 677–78 (2006).
111 Miriam Hechler Baer, Governing Corporate Compliance, 50 B.C. L. REV. 949, 960
(2009); Susan Cleary Morse, The How and Why of the New Public Corporation Tax Shelter
Compliance Norm, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 961 (2006).
112 See JOESEPH E. MURPHY, USING INCENTIVES IN YOUR COMPLIANCE AND ETHICS
PROGRAM (2012), available at http://www.corporatecompliance.org/Resources/View/
smid/940/ArticleID/724.aspx.
113 Id. at 23–32.
114 Id. at 9, 21–22, 32–33.
115 Sokol, supra note 12, at 223–26.
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Incentives and direction from senior management may make
criminality the norm within a firm.116  Rapid growth and unrealistic
company performance forecasts are factors that indicate an increased
likelihood of accounting fraud.117  Additionally, there is some evi-
dence that firms exhibiting an illegal culture will manifest that culture
in a number of different areas—tax, accounting, securities, etc.118
The discussion infra on Bridgestone provides one such example.119
c. Incentive Pay and Individual-Level Motivations
There is a principal-agent problem in firms in which the agents
(employees) veer from what is in the shareholders’ best interest in
order to maximize the individual employee’s best interest.  One way in
which firms reduce the agency cost problem is through incentive-
based pay.  If agents have equity stakes in the firm, they may have
incentives to monitor the firm for illegal activity when the illegal
behavior threatens firm returns.120  In some cases, pay for perform-
ance better aligns managers’ incentives with those of the firm.121
When incentive-based pay is too large, however, it may lead to
illegal behavior.  Theory would suggest that non-linearities in payoffs
(such as large bonuses or stock option grants) encourage cartel behav-
ior on the part of managers.  It is more likely that firms that promote
short-term gains for pay have individuals who may undertake criminal
behavior to “meet the numbers.”122  A number of empirical works
show that CEOs whose pay is incentive-based are more likely to mis-
report material information.123
If officers and directors have an equity stake in the firm, they
have incentives to monitor the firm for illegal activity when the illegal
116 Id.
117 Scott L. Summers & John T. Sweeney, Fraudulently Misstated Financial Statements
and Insider Trading: An Empirical Analysis, 73 ACCT. REV. 131, 132, 136 (1998).
118 Anthony J. Daboub et al., Top Management Team Characteristics and Corporate Ille-
gal Activity, 20 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 138 (1995).
119 See infra notes 193–99 and accompanying text.
120 Alexander & Cohen, supra note 88, at 4, 32.
121 Angela G. Morgan & Annette B. Poulsen, Linking Pay to Performance—Compensa-
tion Proposals in the S&P 500, 62 J. FIN. ECON. 489, 521 (2001).
122 Michael L. Seigel, supra note 6, at 11.  This is also true in the cartel context.
See Gonza´lez et al., supra note 105, at 2–3, 32.
123 Daniel Bergstresser & Thomas Philippon, CEO Incentives and Earnings Manage-
ment, 80 J. FIN. ECON. 511, 512–13 (2006) (finding discretionary accruals used to
manipulate reported earnings); Natasha Burns & Simi Kedia, The Impact of Perform-
ance-Based Compensation on Misreporting, 79 J. FIN. ECON. 35, 63 (2006) (linking CEO
stock options with financial misreporting).
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behavior threatens firm returns.124  However, if managers receive
bonuses based on certain profitability metrics, this may encourage
members to meet their performance-based metric by any means nec-
essary—including becoming involved in a cartel (and in some cases
the senior managers involved in the cartels may be the same ones who
set the financial targets).125
In the cartel agency cost context, too much equity pay may create
negative incentives that may encourage cartel behavior on the part of
managers.126  The short-term incentive of a significant payout will
increase, especially if the risk of detection is low both inside the firm
and by antitrust enforcers.127  Firms may change the incentives for ille-
gality for their employees via a focus in incentive pay on long-term
rather than short-term gain.128
3. Morality: Firm and Society-Based Stigma for Participation in
Cartels
Morality is linked both to firm culture as well as to greater societal
norms.  The perception by society that illegal acts are also immoral
may create increased deterrence within the firm based on a pro-com-
pliance culture.129  There are social costs to individuals for wrongdo-
ing, such as stigma.130  These costs amount to shaming penalties.131
When there are no financial incentives for whistleblowing on car-
124 Alexander & Cohen, supra note 88, at 12, 31–32 (analyzing criminality in sev-
enty-eight firms from 1984–1990).
125 Paolo Buccirossi & Giancarlo Spagnolo, Corporate Governance and Collusive
Behavior, in 2 ISSUES IN COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY 1219, 1224 (Wayne Dale Collins
ed., 2008).
126 For example, incentive compensation for managers is a significant factor in
corporate tax shelter/tax avoidance activities.  Mihir A. Desai & Dhammika
Dharmapala, Corporate Tax Avoidance and Firm Value, 91 REV. ECON. & STAT. 537, 541,
544 n.19 (2009); Mihir A. Desai & Dhammika Dharmapala, Corporate Tax Avoidance
and High-Powered Incentives, 79 J. FIN. ECON. 145, 148, 177 (2006).
127 LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE 174–76 (2004).
128 Id. at 189–92; Lucian A. Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, Paying for Long-Term Perform-
ance, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1915, 1919–20 (2010); Lucian A. Bebchuk & Holger
Spamann, Regulating Bankers’ Pay, 98 GEO. L.J. 247, 251–52 (2010); Sanjai Bhagat &
Roberta Romano, Reforming Executive Compensation: Focusing and Committing to the Long-
Term, 26 YALE J. ON REG. 359, 367 (2009).
129 See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L. REV.
591, 593 (1996) (“Punishment is not just a way to make offenders suffer; it is a special
social convention that signifies moral condemnation.”).
130 Eric Rasmusen, Stigma and Self-Fulfilling Expectations of Criminality, 39 J.L. &
ECON. 519, 536 (1996) (“Stigma shares with fines the advantage of deterring the crim-
inal without creating real costs . . . .”). But see Alon Harel & Alon Klement, The Eco-
nomics of Stigma: Why More Detection of Crime May Result in Less Stigmatization, 36 J. LEGAL
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tels,132 there need to be non-financial incentives to encourage people
within an organization to blow the whistle on others whom they sus-
pect of wrongdoing, either internally or directly to government
enforcers.133  The more that people within the company view cartel
behavior on par with capital crimes,134 the greater the moral outrage
that others will feel toward the perpetrators of such crime and the
more stigma that will attach to the perpetrator.  The mere threat of
such stigma should be able to deter some individuals from participat-
ing in cartel activity.
Stigma also may be felt at the company level in terms of negative
stock market returns due to the loss of branding.  For example, in the
Netherlands, though information about a massive Dutch construction
cartel was already publicly available (and the sanction was already cal-
culated into the stock price), one study found that after a television
show about the cartel appeared, the stock price of firms mentioned in
the television show fell by ten percent.135
Currently, there seems to be a very low level of social stigma asso-
ciated with cartel crimes in the United States.  Part of this is due to the
very low level of media coverage of cartel activity within the United
States relative to other types of corporate crime and the limited media
outreach of U.S. antitrust enforcers relative to other jurisdictions.136
However, some of the lack of stigma for cartel cases is more directly
STUD. 355, 356 (2007) (suggesting that stigma is most effective when it is used only
rarely).
131 Rasmusen, supra note 130, at 520 (demonstrating that a convicted criminal can
suffer from either economic or social stigma).
132 Aubert et al., supra note 59, at 1244–48; William E. Kovacic, Private Monitoring
and Antitrust Enforcement: Paying Informants to Reveal Cartels, 69 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 766,
766 (2001).
133 Alexander Dyck et al., Who Blows the Whistle on Corporate Fraud?, 65 J. FIN. 2213,
2225 (2010) (noting that only eighteen percent of accounting fraud is detected inter-
nally by other employees); Janet P. Near & Marcia P. Miceli, Effective Whistle-Blowing,
20 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 679, 703 (1995) (suggesting two reasons people do not report
in-house: fear of retaliation and expectation that nothing will be done).
134 There is some evidence this may be occurring. See, e.g., Andrea Schoepfer et
al., Do Perceptions of Punishment Vary Between White-Collar and Street Crimes?, 35 J. CRIM.
JUST. 151, 160 (2007) (noting data reveals “those most likely to have access to white-
collar crime opportunities” consider the two crimes to be “equally serious and war-
ranting similar punishments”).
135 Johan J. Graafland, Collusion, Reputation Damage and Interest in Codes of Conduct:
The Case of a Dutch Construction Company, 13 BUS. ETHICS: EUR. REV. 127, 127, 130–31
(2004).  Typically what causes stock prices to decline is uncertainty.  Once a fine is
paid the stock typically goes up.  Graafland suggests that moral shaming had an eco-
nomic effect. See id. at 131.
136 Sokol, supra note 12, at 216–20.
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tied to a poor compliance culture by cartel-member firms.  Connor
and Lande reveal alarming statistics about the acceptance of illegal
cartel behavior.  They note:
We were able to determine the present whereabouts of 35 (34%)
out of 103 managers known to have received a prison sentence in
cartel cases between 1995 and 2010.  Of those 35, 9 (26%) are cur-
rently employed by the company for which they worked during the
cartel, and another 9 (26%) seem to be working at a different com-
pany within the same industry. . . . We were also able to discover the
current whereabouts of four people who received fines, but no
prison sentence during the period between 1995 and 2009.  Two of
them are employed by the same company for which they worked
during the cartel, one appears to be working in the same industry,
and the other is working in another industry.137
U.S. antitrust law is different from other areas of law, such as
securities law, where convicted or civilly sanctioned offenders may be
barred from the industry and can be debarred from doing business
with the government.138  Antitrust law chooses not to use debar-
ment.139  Where there are no explicit restrictions, such as through the
terms of a company’s plea agreement, to rehire convicted cartel
felons, social shaming could increase the cost of participating in such
activity.
a. Senior Management Within an Organization
A crucial dimension of better incentives for improved compliance
takes into account the distinction between managerial incentives and
shareholder incentives, and between the incentives of a middle man-
ager and those of a senior manager.  This next subsection examines
the interrelationships between different individuals within the firm
and across firms to better understand what might constitute effective
compliance in the antitrust setting.
137 John M. Connor & Robert H. Lande, Cartels as Rational Business Strategy: Crime
Pays, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 427, 441–42 (2012) (footnotes omitted).
138 See, e.g., Jayne W. Barnard, SEC Debarment of Officers and Directors After Sarbanes-
Oxley, 59 BUS. L. 391, 391 (2004).  Of course, debarment is tricky because debarring a
number of competitors may lead to a single firm (or perhaps no firm) being left to
bid for the government work.  Thus, the debarment threat for firms in a cartel may be
hollow.  At the individual level, debarment may be a more realistic penalty.
139 See, e.g., Connor & Lande, supra note 137, at 437 & n.38 (noting that while
some commentators have proposed using debarment as a method of deterrence, it is
not widely used).
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Senior management is an important component of firm govern-
ance and compliance.140  Different management styles affect corpo-
rate decision-making in a number of areas, such as investment and
financial policy, tax compliance, and organizational strategy.141  The
focus on senior management in antitrust law is particularly important.
The majority of individual defendants in cartel cases have been at the
level of a company’s corporate officers.142
The proclivity of criminality within top management may be due
to the large amount of power that top management possesses.  There-
fore, the preferences of top management will affect strategic out-
comes of a corporation.143  Some work suggests that longer CEO
tenure144 and top management team tenure145 negatively affect the
140 Marianne Bertrand & Antoinette Schoar, Managing with Style: The Effect of Man-
agers on Firm Policies, 118 Q.J. ECON. 1169, 1173 (2003) (explaining that the traditional
neo-classical economic view of the corporation is that the particular top leadership
did not matter). But see DEP’T OF DEF., REPORT OF THE DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD TASK
FORCE ON MANAGEMENT OVERSIGHT IN ACQUISITION ORGANIZATIONS 14 (2005), availa-
ble at http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/ADA435469.pdf (providing evidence of
how employees look for cues from senior management on ethics and corporate cul-
ture); Sydney Finkelstein & Donald C. Hambrick, Top-Management-Team Tenure and
Organizational Outcomes: The Moderating Role of Managerial Discretion, 35 ADMIN. SCI. Q.
484, 501 (1990) (same); Donald C. Hambrick & Phyllis A. Mason, Upper Echelons: The
Organization as a Reflection of Its Top Managers, 9 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 193, 193 (1984)
(same); Donald C. Hambrick, Upper Echelons Theory: An Update, 32 ACAD. MGMT. REV.
334, 341 (2007) (same).
141 Bertrand & Schoar, supra note 140, at 1176, 1204; Scott D. Dyreng et al., The
Effects of Executives on Corporate Tax Avoidance, 85 ACCT. REV. 1163, 1187 (2010) (find-
ing executive-specific effects that firm characteristics cannot explain).
142 Joseph C. Gallo et al., Department of Justice Antitrust Enforcement, 1955–1997: An
Empirical Study, 17 REV. INDUS. ORG. 75, 104–07 (2000); Andreas Stephan, Hear No
Evil, See No Evil: Why Antitrust Compliance Programmes May Be Ineffective at Preventing
Cartels 8–10 (Econ. & Soc. Research Council Ctr. for Competition Policy & Norwich
Law Sch., Univ. of E. Anglia, Working Paper No. 09–09, 2009), available at http://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1432340.
143 Mason A. Carpenter et al., Upper Echelons Research Revisited: Antecedents, Elements,
and Consequences of Top Management Team Composition, 30 J. MGMT. 749, 750, 774
(2004); Arijit Chatterjee & Donald C. Hambrick, It’s All About Me: Narcissistic Chief
Executive Officers and Their Effects on Company Strategy and Performance, 52 ADMIN. SCI. Q.
351, 372 (2007) (finding a relationship between narcissistic CEOs and extreme com-
pany performance).  Some argue that because top management personnel base deci-
sions on their own experiences, this might suggest more of a behavioral explanation
to top management. See, e.g., Colin Camerer & Dan Lovallo, Overconfidence and Excess
Entry: An Experimental Approach, 89 AM. ECON. REV. 306, 306, 313–16 (1999) (evaluat-
ing how overconfidence can affect individuals’ “economic behavior”).
144 Danny Miller, Stale in the Saddle: CEO Tenure and the Match Between Organization
and Environment, 37 MGMT. SCI. 34, 34, 49 (1991).
145 Finkelstein & Hambrick, supra note 140, at 498.
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strategic dynamics of a corporation.146  As any stability usually favors
cooperative outcomes,147 then more stable firm management in an
industry should facilitate collusion.
There are various internal control devices to better align the
incentives of shareholders and management, so as to improve the
quality of oversight and reduce incentives for cartel activity.  For
example, companies might issue debt to constrain management from
over-investment.148  Separation of the CEO and chairman positions
improves the board’s ability to monitor the CEO.149  Similarly, provid-
ing equity for directors might give rise to improved monitoring of
management by directors by better aligning director interests with
shareholder interests.150  Moreover, board diversity serves to better
monitor CEOs, based on CEO turnover.151
The ethical tone of top management affects organizational
responses to wrongdoing.152  If top management tolerates or is
involved in illegality, this norm permeates within the organization.153
Younger managers may be “trained” by the older generation to par-
ticipate in cartels.154
146 Andrew D. Henderson et al., How Quickly Do CEOs Become Obsolete? Industry
Dynamism, CEO Tenure, and Company Performance, 27 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 447, 458
(2006).
147 George J. Stigler, A Theory of Oligopoly, 72 J. POL. ECON. 44, 48 (1964)
(“[C]ollusion is severely limited . . . when the significant buyers constantly change
identity.”).
148 Campbell R. Harvey et al., The Effect of Capital Structure When Expected Agency
Costs Are Extreme, 74 J. FIN. ECON. 3, 4, 27 (2004).
149 John E. Core et al., Corporate Governance, Chief Executive Officer Compensation, and
Firm Performance, 51 J. FIN. ECON. 371, 372, 382, 404 (1999); Jap Efendi et al., Why Do
Corporate Managers Misstate Financial Statements? The Role of Option Compensation and
Other Factors, 85 J. FIN. ECON. 667, 703 (2007).
150 Mine Ertugrul & Shantaram Hegde, Board Compensation Practices and Agency
Costs of Debt, 14 J. CORP. FIN. 512, 529–30 (2008); Michael C. Jensen, The Modern Indus-
trial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of Internal Control Systems, 48 J. FIN. 831, 864–65
(1993).
151 Rene´e B. Adams & Daniel Ferreira, Women in the Boardroom and Their Impact on
Governance and Performance, 94 J. FIN. ECON. 291, 292, 298, 301–02, 307–08 (2009);
Michael S. Weisbach, Outside Directors and CEO Turnover, 20 J. FIN. ECON. 431, 458–59
(1988).
152 Linda Klebe Trevin˜o et al., A Qualitative Investigation of Perceived Executive Ethical
Leadership: Perceptions from Inside and Outside the Executive Suite, 56 HUM. REL. 5, 28–29
(2003).
153 See Melvin A. Eisenberg, Corporate Law and Social Norms, 99 COLUM. L. REV.
1253, 1270–71 (1999).
154 Geis, supra note 92, at 123–26.
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The more ethical top management seems to be, the more ethi-
cally others in the organization tend to behave.155  Similarly, the more
top management is involved in creating codes of conduct, the more
effective such codes are in practice.156
In an antitrust context, the tone of senior management matters
to the organization.  From a pro-compliance standpoint, if the CEO
mandates and attends antitrust trainings, middle managers are more
likely to take such compliance seriously.  The CEO must project a sin-
cere desire to comply with antitrust law.  This will set the tone for the
entire organization in terms of its compliance.157  The CEO must be
fully committed to the antitrust compliance program and consistent
in such commitment.158  The more powerful the messenger, the more
likely that others within the organization will conform to the message
because of the CEO’s ability to offer compliant managers greater
resources, legitimacy, and power.159  Therefore, the involvement by
top management in cartel activities may merit tougher penalties, since
senior management involvement signals compliance weakness and a
corrupt culture overall.
b. Middle Management and Other Employees
Within the firm, middle management may not have the same
incentives for committing violations or complying with the law as
senior management.  Indeed, the rewards are greater for senior man-
agement than mid-level management.  Regarding middle manage-
ment, for example, in a divisional organizational model, each
divisional unit may try to maximize the short-term profitability of that
particular division instead of the entity as a whole.160  This suggests
155 Linda K. Trevin˜o et al., Behavioral Ethics in Organizations: A Review, 32 J. MGMT.
951, 966–68 (2006).
156 See Jeffrey R. Cohen & Dennis M. Hanno, Auditors’ Consideration of Corporate
Governance and Management Control Philosophy in Preplanning and Planning Judgments, 19
AUDITING: J. PRAC. & THEORY 133, 143 (2000).
157 See generally Anne Riley & Margaret Bloom, Antitrust Compliance Program-
mes–Can Companies and Antitrust Agencies Do More?, 1 COMPETITION L.J. 21 (2011).
158 AM. BAR. ASS’N, ANTITRUST COMPLIANCE 20 (2d ed. 2010) (providing an exam-
ple of DuPont CEO who regularly raises antitrust compliance with senior leadership
of the company and provides a signal of its importance).
159 See Paul J. DiMaggio & Walter W. Powell, The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional
Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields, 48 AM. SOC. REV. 147, 150,
157 (1983); Christine Oliver, Strategic Responses to Institutional Processes, 16 ACAD.
MGMT. REV. 145, 145, 146, 148–49, 173 (1991).
160 Hyun-Han Shin & Rene´ M. Stulz, Are Internal Capital Markets Efficient?, 113 Q.J.
ECON. 531, 533 (1998).
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that organizational structure may be a contributing cause for misalign-
ment of incentives.
Culture may shape the behavior of middle managers.  To become
successful leaders in companies, middle management and lower-level
employees may mimic the behavior of senior management.161  This
may include behavior such as cartel involvement if such cartel partici-
pation allows these middle managers to move up the ranks.
Middle managers may be under significant pressure to meet vari-
ous performance targets.162  The financial rewards or possibilities for
prestige or promotion for managers may be different than for the
firm as a whole.163  Other motivations also may be at play.  A cartelist
may rationally risk criminality because he/she wants to save jobs in
his/her group or division.  The cartel participant believes that as long
as other firms do the same during a time of economic downturn, a
cartel will naturally break up when the economy improves.164  Leni-
ency may be a way in an ethical corporation to increase the monitor-
ing of senior management committing cartel crimes by mid-level
management because leniency allows for self-reporting.
4. Industry-Level Factors
The industry in which a firm operates may affect outcomes.
There are factors exogenous to a particular firm that also may affect
its predisposition to criminal behavior.  Industry structure and poor
industry performance may indicate criminality.165  Similarly, firms in
some industries are more prone to criminality than others based on
industry culture.166
161 See Joseph Galaskiewicz & Stanley Wasserman, Mimetic Processes Within an Inter-
organizational Field: An Empirical Test, 34 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 454, 454–56 (1989); Pamela R.
Haunschild & Anne S. Miner, Modes of Interorganizational Imitation: The Effects of Out-
come Salience and Uncertainty, 42 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 472, 474–75 (1997).
162 Cindy R. Alexander & Mark A. Cohen, New Evidence on the Origins of Corporate
Crime, 17 MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 421, 421, 433 (1996).
163 Philip G. Berger & Eli Ofek, Diversification’s Effect on Firm Value, 37 J. FIN. ECON.
39, 40 (1995).
164 People make similar calculations as to illegal behavior in other areas of corpo-
rate crimes, such as pollution.  Robert A. Kagan, Environmental Management Style and
Corporate Environmental Performance, in LEVERAGING THE PRIVATE SECTOR 31, 42–43
(Cary Coglianese & Jennifer Nash eds., 2006).
165 Barry M. Staw & Eugene Szwajkowski, The Scarcity-Munificence Component of
Organizational Environments and the Commission of Illegal Acts, 20 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 345, 351
(1975) (describing that companies cited for illegal acts were less munificent than
those that were not cited).
166 Baucus & Near, supra note 98, at 9, 27–28; Daboub et al., supra note 118, at
141–43.
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Specific to antitrust compliance, antitrust scholarship provides a
sense of the types of industry factors on which cartel stability seems to
depend for its operation.167  For example, industry or product cycle,
competition within the sector, and cultural factors as to the nature
and stability of the cartel influence the effectiveness of leniency.168
Industry features such as high concentration, entry barriers, relatively
inelastic demand, homogeneous products, and greater demand
shocks affect the decisions of firms within an industry to participate in
a cartel.  These industry factors are important for enforcement
because cartel stability mitigates the effectiveness of leniency.169
Industry growth impacts internal compliance.  Where there is
rapid growth in an industry, it may be that internal controls may not
yet be strong enough to prevent wrongdoing.170  Accordingly, such
industries may be more prone to cartel behavior because formal and
informal monitoring mechanisms are not in place.171  The monitoring
mechanisms within the firm also impact the ability of a firm to create
a distinct culture relative to that of other firms in the same industry.172
167 RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 79–93 (2d ed. 2001) (providing fourteen
different factors to consider for tacit collusion); Harold Demsetz, Industry Structure,
Market Rivalry, and Public Policy, 16 J.L. & ECON. 1, 5 (1973); Richard A. Posner, Oligop-
oly and the Antitrust Laws: A Suggested Approach, 21 STAN. L. REV. 1562 (1969); Stigler,
supra note 147, at 44–56. But see JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZA-
TION 239–61 (1988) (suggesting extensions and limitations to Stigler and others).
168 Harold Houba et al., Maximal Cartel Pricing and Leniency Programs, TINBERGEN
INST. DISCUSSION PAPER NO. 2008-120/1, at 31–34, available at http://papers
.tinbergen.nl/08120.pdf (arguing that more stable industries and stronger industry
culture make leniency less effective).
169 Id.
170 Kimberly D. Krawiec, The Return of the Rogue, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. 127, 168 (2009).
171 Some academics speculate that price fixing may be more likely where the
industry is in decline. See, e.g., Sally S. Simpson, The Decomposition of Antitrust: Testing a
Multi-Level, Longitudinal Model of Profit-Squeeze, 51 AM. SOC. REV. 859, 872 (1986).
There is not strong direct evidence in the academic literature indicating that finan-
cially weaker firms are more likely to cartelize. See Andreas Stephan, Price Fixing in
Crisis: Implications of an Economic Downturn for Cartels and Enforcement, 35 WORLD COMPE-
TITION 511 (2012).
172 Cartels also require relatively stable contacts between the actors, which are less
likely to be the case in new/nascent/fast-developing industries.
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II. CHANGING PENALTY STRUCTURES
A. Compliance Programs and the Creation of Super Leniency
To encourage cartel detection, DOJ Antitrust provides leniency
for corporations and individuals.173  The leniency program allows for
firms to self-report their cartel activity in return for zero government
penalties.  In the United States, leniency creates a prisoner’s dilemma
to encourage defection—the firm that is the leniency applicant
receives amnesty from criminal prosecution and a reduction from
treble to single damages if it fully cooperates.  Other firms involved in
the cartel may receive lower financial penalties if they provide addi-
tional information to DOJ Antitrust that results in detection of other
cartels, under a program known as Amnesty Plus.  The possibility that
firms might defect from a cartel and inform on its cartel members
destabilizes many existing cartels and deters other cartels from being
formed.174  DOJ Antitrust now detects most cartels as a result of the
leniency program.175
Yet, the leniency program has certain limits.  In particular, the
leniency program does not reward the adoption of a rigorous compli-
ance program (other than being the first to self-report).176  Indeed,
the leniency program utilizes a strict liability regime for wrongdoing.
This is a departure from other areas of corporate crime where a com-
pliance program allows for a penalty reduction under the Federal Sen-
tencing Guidelines and programs are taken into account in enforcers’
173 Scott D. Hammond, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Antitrust
Div., The Evolution of Criminal Antitrust Enforcement Over the Last Two Decades,
Speech Before the National Institute on White Collar Crime (Feb. 25, 2010), available
at  http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/255515.pdf.
174 The opposite may also be true.  Leniency programs help with detection, but
they can increase incentives to form a cartel because they reduce the expected fines
firms have to pay (since there is some chance they won’t pay any criminal fines as a
result of leniency).
175 Hammond, supra note 173, at 3.  Of the two programs, the corporate leniency
program is by far the most used.  What DOJ Antitrust means by detection is not always
clear.  It may be that the leniency program detects the cartel or it may be that first
DOJ has a leniency applicant, but the “detection” process starts with some type of
investigative work prior to any firm applying for leniency.
176 Outside of the antitrust area, a compliance program also may be (at least in
part) a basis for a decision not to charge under the operative DOJ charging discretion
memos. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL, § 9-28.800
(2008), available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/
title9/28mcrm.htm#9-28.800; U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, A
RESOURCE GUIDE TO THE U.S. FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT (Nov. 14, 2012), avail-
able at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/guide.pdf.
2013] policing  the  firm 819
decisions on how to proceed against the company.177  The motivation
behind penalty mitigation and taking programs into account is to
encourage companies to proactively set up compliance programs to
minimize wrongdoing and build an infrastructure of good
governance.
Informally and at various practitioner conferences (such as those
organized by the American Bar Association Section of Antitrust Law),
DOJ Antitrust officials have stated that the proper application of the
Guidelines almost always results in no credit being given for a compli-
ance program in the sentencing calculations in an antitrust case
because these violations are almost always participated in, condoned
by, or occur with the willful ignorance of, high-level or substantial
authority personnel.  Under the Sentencing Guidelines, the three
point credit for compliance programs simply does not apply (or, in
the case of substantial authority personnel, there is a rebuttable pre-
sumption against credit) in such cases.  Hypothetically, where the
offense occurs without high-level involvement, DOJ Antitrust might
give credit for a compliance program.178  However, in its public dis-
course, some DOJ Antitrust officials have mentioned an antitrust carve
out from Sentencing Guideline Section 8C2.5(f) regarding compli-
ance mitigation.179
The law on the books provides no such carve-out.180  DOJ Anti-
trust has tended to conflate the Guidelines penalty analysis with the
Department of Justice’s approach to prosecutorial discretion,
although the two are distinct.  The Department, in all cases except
antitrust, does take programs into account with no automatic carve-
outs that are based on the fact that individual employees committing a
177 Technically, a compliance program can receive credit in an antitrust case
under the United States Sentencing Guidelines, although it is difficult.  The substan-
tial authority personnel reference only creates a rebuttable presumption against
credit; there have been no cases I know of attempting to meet this standard, but
corporate cases almost never go to trial.
178 I could not find such reported cases.
179 The 2010 modifications to the Sentencing Guidelines now allow credit even if
a high-level person is involved.  There are four qualifiers, one being voluntary disclo-
sure.  DOJ Antitrust says this equates to the leniency program, but this is factually
wrong.
180 Section 2R1.1(d)(2) limits any mitigating factor so the fine is never less than
75% of the base. U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION, GUIDELINES MANUAL, § 2R1.1(d)(2)
(2011), available at http://www.ussc.gov/Guidelines/2011_Guidelines/Manual_
HTML/2r1_1.htm.  Plus, the definition of substantial authority personnel, with lan-
guage proposed in 1991 by the Antitrust Division, is designed to make credit impossi-
ble.  It is better described as a de facto carve out.  But, of course, almost no big
company ever goes to trial, so it is more symbolic than anything else.
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violation may have had authority and discretion.181  The rest of the
Department of Justice will consider compliance programs in the vari-
ous stages of dealing with corporations; DOJ Antitrust appears to
avoid programs at all stages of the process.
Leniency alone is not sufficient to deter all cartels given current
detection rates.  Those cartels that can adapt to leniency through bet-
ter cartel management may avoid detection.182  Leniency programs
may have resulted in less inclusive cartels because having too many
members increases the possibility of detection, at least among those
cartels that have been detected.  While a more inclusive cartel means
higher cartel profits, each additional member is one more firm who
could apply for leniency.183  As a result of this higher cost of cartel
participation, cartels have become more effective in the concealment
of their activity.184
What current antitrust cartel policy lacks are positive incentives to
create robust and effective compliance programs to improve cartel
detection.  This Article proposes that the leniency applicant firm
receive no government sanction and no private damages in return for
full cooperation if the applicant can show that it had an effective com-
pliance program in place (as determined via the creation of antitrust
compliance guidelines) that detected the cartel conduct.  The current
system creates criminal immunity and removes treble damages for the
leniency applicant.  The proposed approach would destabilize cartels
through an increased threat of defection because the leniency appli-
cant could keep its illegal gains.  Moreover, it would create incentives
for firms to spend additional resources ex ante on antitrust compliance
because the amount spent on additional effective compliance would
be less than the cost of detection.  This would create better incentives
for detection.
181 See, e.g., Press Release No. 12-534, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Crim. Div., Former
Morgan Stanley Managing Director Pleads Guilty for Role in Evading Internal Con-
trols Required by FCPA  (Apr. 25, 2012), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/
2012/April/12-crm-534.html.
182 Joe Chen & Joseph E. Harrington, Jr., The Impact of the Corporate Leniency Pro-
gram on Cartel Formation and the Cartel Price Path, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF ANTI-
TRUST, supra note 38, at 59.
183 For a similar situation in the tax context, see generally Mark P. Gergen, The
Logic of Deterrence: Corporate Tax Shelters, 55 TAX L. REV. 255 (2002).  A tax shelter pro-
moter faces the calculus that more sales of the shelter provide greater profit in the
short-term, but greater risk of discovery and sanction in the longer term.
184 See Robert C. Marshall et al., Antitrust Leniency with Multi-Product Colluders 31
(July 2, 2013) (working paper), available at http://www.bateswhite.com/media/pnc/
7/media.727.pdf.
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A robust compliance program could work with the existing leni-
ency program.  The better the compliance program, the greater the
incentive for a firm to defect from the cartel through leniency (assum-
ing that the legal regime creates sufficient rewards for good
compliance).
Early detection allows a firm to reap the benefits of an effective
compliance program.185  Motivating a penalty reduction is that one
firm within the cartel will have better compliance results than the
others.  The penalty reduction encourages incentives for the weakest
link to defect from a cartel.  A better set of proactive incentives
(assuming that a company meets the Sentencing Guidelines steps for
effective compliance) will create enough encouragement for at least
one firm within the cartel to invest in proactive compliance against
potential wrongdoing.
Under current practice, in following the Sentencing Guidelines, a
company paradoxically increases its likelihood of sanctioning by the
government.  By ignoring the Guidelines and providing cosmetic com-
pliance, a company increases the potential payoff from illegal activity
(by keeping both its compliance costs and risk of detection low), while
increasing the benefit from its illegal behavior.186
With the proposal for super leniency, addressing what constitutes
effective compliance becomes paramount.187  It is difficult to deter-
mine what constitutes a “good” compliance program ex ante.  Yet, what
may make antitrust different from other areas of white collar crime
may lie in the mechanics of price fixing.  It may be easier for an out-
sider to monitor for criminal cartel-threatening activity than to moni-
tor for, say, foreign corrupt practices.  In many cases, criminal
antitrust violations are relatively straightforward doctrinally and con-
185 Strategically, by coming in for the reward of more generous leniency, a firm
also punishes its competitors, who must pay a larger fine, face criminal penalties, and
bear the extra imposition of, as this Article proposes, a corporate monitor.  The
incentive for a firm may be to participate in a cartel but to defect before anyone else
does.  However, each firm may have this same logic.  Super leniency thereby creates
increased instability because of the fear that another firm will defect before yours
does.
186 This critique is not limited merely to U.S. anti-cartel efforts.  In a survey of 999
of the largest 2500 Australian businesses, Parker and Nielson found compliance with
competition laws to be highly variable, with implementation half-hearted and incom-
plete in many cases.  Christine Parker & Vibeke Lehmann Nielsen, Do Businesses Take
Compliance Systems Seriously? An Empirical Study of the Implementation of Trade Practices
Compliance Systems in Australia, 30 MELB. U. L. REV. 441, 444, 482–83 (2006).
187 Super-leniency does not replace traditional leniency but is an addition to it.
This way those companies who lacked a rigorous compliance program but were lucky
and uncovered a cartel are still rewarded for coming forward.
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ceptually, and the criminal action is undertaken by relatively high
level executives.  One example is the price index and direct communi-
cations between the conspirators in the air cargo cartel.  Another typi-
cal antitrust case is the well-known lysine cartel of the 1990s that
resulted in a bestselling book and a movie starring Matt Damon in
which executives from the lysine industry met in hotels to discuss
price fixing.188
This Article’s policy proposal can be contrasted with other recent
policy suggestions.  Spagnolo and his co-authors have pushed for a
lottery for the leniency applicant, in which the leniency applicant
would be awarded all of the fines of the other cartel members.189
In a real world setting, there are dangers to effective cartel policy
from too much leniency, such as the cartel lottery.  One danger is that
the bounty awarded from the fines paid by other cartel members gives
the firm receiving the bounty a competitive advantage such that other
firms may exit the market, thereby creating potential antitrust
problems of monopolization.  In addition, it may be difficult to sell
the bounty system to the public at large.  In this case, a member of a
criminal conspiracy that hurts consumers goes without significant
punishment and in fact is rewarded with a bounty.  This can give rise
to backlash against any penalty reduction to cartel enforcement.190
Antitrust authorities that promoted a competition culture to soci-
ety might get pushback from a populace that wants to see firms
receive punishment for wrongdoing rather than a windfall.  For exam-
ple, press coverage in the U.K. for mere traditional leniency against
Virgin Airways in its fuel surcharge cartel with British Airways gave rise
to significant criticism of the U.K.’s Office of Fair Trading, because
the leniency applicant seemed to escape without sufficient penal-
ties.191  The pushback would be even stronger in the presence of sig-
nificant financial rewards to a company that financially benefits from
its illegality and who will be strengthened at the expense of its rivals.
188 KURT EICHENWALD, THE INFORMANT (2000).  Oftentimes, there is sufficient
proof based merely on direct evidence akin to the lysine cartel.
189 Maria Bigoni et al., Fines, Leniency, and Rewards in Antitrust, 43 RAND J. ECON.
368 (2012); Giancarlo Spagnolo, Divide et Impera: Optimal Deterrence Mechanisms Against
Cartels and Organized Crime 4-5 (Univ. of Mannheim C.E.P.R., Working Paper, 2003).
These works view the firm/decision-maker solely as a profit-maximizer, so there are
no criminal penalties.  This view also does not disaggregate the firm from the individ-
ual decision-makers within the firm.
190 See Andreas Stephan, How Dishonesty Killed the Cartel Offence, 6 CRIM. L. REV.
446, 453 (2011).
191 Andreas Stephan, The UK Cartel Offence: Lame Duck or Black Mamba? 18–19
(ESRC Centre for Competition Policy (CCP) Working Paper No. 08-19, 2008), availa-
ble at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1310683.
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B. Using Corporate Monitors for Criminal Antitrust
1. FCPA and Monitors
Harsher penalties are a mechanism to motivate better compli-
ance. This Article suggests that harsher penalties should take the
form of a corporate monitor automatically imposed upon any com-
pany found to be involved in criminal antitrust wrongdoing other
than the leniency applicant.  The use of corporate monitors is increas-
ingly common in other areas of white collar crime, but does not seem
to have made a significant impact in criminal antitrust.  Two recent
cases in which antitrust monitors were placed are outliers because the
companies refused to plead guilty, as is the norm in antitrust cases,
and one of the companies went so far as to contest (and lose) the
price fixing charges at trial.192
Corporate monitors have been used for a number of different
corporate crimes, not merely the FCPA, although this subsection dis-
cusses the FCPA as an example.193  A recent plea agreement provides
an illustration of the sharp contrast in approaches between DOJ Anti-
trust’s approach to compliance and that of DOJ’s Criminal Division.
On September 9, 2011, both the DOJ Antitrust Division and
Criminal Division entered into a plea agreement with Bridgestone
Corporation regarding white collar criminal activity.194  Bridgestone, a
Japanese company, pled guilty for price fixing from January 1999 to
May 2007 as part of the international marine hose cartel.195
192 Sentencing Memorandum at 53, United States v. AU Optronics Corp., No. CR-
09-0110 SI (N.D. Cal. Sept. 11, 2012) (DOJ Antitrust did not impose monitors on any
of the other firms in the LCD cartel, nor did the proposed consent address terms that
are standard in white collar crime regarding corporate monitors such as compliance
audits and discussion about controls on trade associations), available at
www.justice.gov/atr/cases/f286900/286934_1.pdf; United States v. Fla. W. Int’l Air-
ways, Inc., 282 F.R.D. 695, 696-97 (S.D. Fla. 2012) (stating that Florida West pled nolo
contendere).  One can think of the role of the monitor in terms of looking for cartel
“plus factors.” See Kovacic et al., supra note 7.  The monitor would have access to data
that would not be available to, say, outside enforcement authorities without discovery.
193 International organizations also require some sort of monitoring as a result of
corporate wrongdoing.  The World Bank requires that any company who is a World
Bank contractor that undertakes voluntary disclosure for corruption be required to
implement an effective compliance program. WORLD BANK, VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE
PROGRAM (VDP) GUIDELINES FOR PARTICIPANTS 11 (2011), available at http://site
resources.worldbank.org/INTVOLDISPRO/Resources/VDP_Guidelines_2011.pdf.
194 Plea Agreement, United States v. Bridgestone Corp., No. 4:11-cr-00651 (S.D.
Tex. Oct. 5, 2011) [hereinafter Bridgestone Plea Agreement], available at http://
www.justice.gov/atr/cases/f282400/282479.pdf.
195 Id. at 3.
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Bridgestone also pled guilty to bribery in violation of the FCPA196
for activities that occurred within this same time period.  Its corrupt
activities occurred through Bridgestone’s various subsidiaries in which
its local sales agents had illegal relationships with government officials
who worked for state owned enterprises (SOEs) in Latin America.197
The Bridgestone sales agents paid the officials who worked in the
SOEs a percentage of the total deal.  Bridgestone managers in Japan
were not only aware of these payments but authorized and worked to
conceal them.198
In both the case of the cartel and the bribes, Bridgestone admit-
ted to criminal behavior on the part of its executives.  One might
imagine that the remedies for both sets of circumstances would be
similar for criminal activity within what one might describe as a corpo-
rate culture that permitted, and indeed encouraged, criminal behav-
ior across different international business units.
Attachment B to the plea agreement included a detailed corpo-
rate compliance program that Bridgestone entered into to review its
internal controls to prevent future wrongdoing.  This included the
implementation of a “clearly articulated and visible corporate policy
against violations . . . including strong, explicit, and visible support
and commitment from senior management to the program.”199  It
also required that “Bridgestone will develop and promulgate compli-
ance standards and procedures designed to reduce the prospect of
violations . . . and will take appropriate measures to encourage and
support the observance of ethics and compliance standards . . . at all
levels of the company.”200  Additional provisions detailed the type of
implementation that would be undertaken as part of the monitoring
to ensure that there would be no future violations.  These steps
included details regarding how to address the behavior of senior and
mid-level executives within the firm so as to overcome the criminal
behavior that at best was tolerated and at worst actively encouraged.
What is striking about this detailed corporate compliance pro-
gram is that the compliance program was exclusively set up for the
FCPA violations.  There was no mention of the cartel activity and no
mechanisms set up to prevent future cartel activity.  This is particularly
interesting since the same firm was involved in both sorts of criminal
activities.  It is this strange disparity in punishment policies—one that
196 15 U.S.C. § 78 dd-3 (2006).
197 Bridgestone Plea Agreement, supra note 194, at 8.
198 Id. at 9.
199 Id. at Attachment B.
200 Id.
2013] policing  the  firm 825
takes compliance seriously (FCPA) and another that does not (anti-
trust) that is the focus of this Section.  This Section will explain what a
corporate monitor does, the problem that it attempts to solve, and the
limits of the effectiveness of corporate monitors to date in the non-
antitrust context.  After providing this analysis of corporate monitors
outside of antitrust, the Section then explains the dynamics of moni-
toring within antitrust and the curious case of criminal antitrust,
which seems relatively unaffected by developments in enforcement in
other areas of white collar crime.
Congress enacted the FCPA to combat bribery in 1977.  The
FCPA prohibits bribery of foreign officials and requires that publicly
traded firms maintain accurate accounting controls as part of finan-
cial transparency to better detect potentially illegal payments.201  How-
ever, FCPA enforcement became vigorous only in the past decade.202
In 2004, federal enforcers brought only five actions (two DOJ actions
and three SEC actions).203  In contrast, from 2007 to 2009, FCPA
actions averaged thirty-seven actions per year, and in 2010 alone the
SEC and DOJ Criminal Division brought a combined seventy-four
FCPA actions.204  The government’s increased use of the FCPA has
also increased the use of corporate monitors as a remedy in FCPA
cases.
2. Monitors and Rehabilitation
If criminal and civil penalties are leading to under-deterrence,
then the potential imposition of a monitor for wrongdoing is the type
of penalty that may lead companies to invest more in compliance.
Such deterrence is useful only when the costs of deterrence for the
use of monitors are fewer than other forms of punishment and where
the benefits of the use of monitors exceed that of other forms of
deterrence.  There might be more than just deterrence, however, that
drives the use of monitors.
201 Joseph W. Yockey, Solicitation, Extortion, and the FCPA 5 (Univ. of Iowa College
of Law, Working Paper No. 11-30, 2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1896282.
202 Mike Koehler, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act in the Ultimate Year of Its Decade of
Resurgence, 43 IND. L. REV. 389, 389 (2010).
203 See GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP, 2010 YEAR-END FCPA UPDATE (Jan. 3,
2011), available at http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/pages/2010Year-End
FCPAUpdate.aspx.
204 Id.
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Rehabilitation has been discussed in criminal law, although it has
become somewhat discredited.205  In the corporate context, one
might view rehabilitation as a goal, in addition to that of optimal
deterrence, as monitors “treat” corporate offenders to help design
compliance programs to eliminate their recidivist tendencies.  Accord-
ingly, none of the traditional reasons (cost, fairness, and failure) that
explain why rehabilitation has been discredited apply in the corporate
context.206
On cost, the public does not need to pay for the treatment pro-
gram the way that it would for an individual.  The firm that commits
the crime would pay for its own treatment, which therefore is not a
benefit that it would otherwise get for committing the crime.  On fair-
ness, the typical critique is that the public believes it to be unfair to
provide things such as education training or drug treatment to offend-
ers to make their lives better.  This is simply not applicable to the cor-
porate context.  The final issue is one in which rehabilitation may lead
to recidivism anyway.  In the corporate context, effective monitoring
of a corporation can change the nature of corporate oversight to cre-
ate better mechanisms to prevent recidivism.
3. Monitors in Practice
As a general matter, a corporate monitor crafts a work plan as to
what it will do and how much authority it will have to implement
changes that it sees fit.207  In this sense, monitors have wide latitude of
discretion in the use of their power.208  The duration of corporate
monitors is typically between one and three years, although there have
been cases of monitors having longer tenures.209  In situations of cor-
porate governance misconduct, the compliance officer typically
205 See, e.g., FRANCIS A. ALLEN, THE DECLINE OF THE REHABILITATIVE IDEAL 2–4
(1981); Philip J. Cook, Punishment and Crime: A Critique of Current Findings Concerning
the Preventive Effects of Punishment, 41 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 164, 171, 204 (1977);
Michael Vitiello, Reconsidering Rehabilitation, 65 TUL. L. REV. 1011 (1991); Andrew von
Hirsch & Lisa Maher, Should Penal Rehabilitation be Revived?, in PRINCIPLED SENTENCING
26 (Andrew von Hirsch & Andrew Ashworth eds., 2d ed. 1998).
206 On collective guilt, see R. A. DUFF, ANSWERING FOR CRIME (2007); R.A. DUFF,
PUNISHMENT, COMMUNICATION, AND COMMUNITY (2001). But see Bill Wringe, Collective
Agents and the Communicative Theories of Punishment, 43 J. SOC. PHIL. 436 (2012)
(explaining why collective guilt should not apply in the corporate context).
207 Khanna & Dickinson, supra note 10, at 1725.
208 Id. at 1723–24.
209 Id. at 1723.
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reports to the audit committee of the company and to the relevant
government enforcer.210
To provide additional guidance,211 the Department of Justice
released a document in 2008 known as the Morford Memo.212  That
memo provided some vague limits regarding when a corporate moni-
tor should be introduced.  According to the memorandum,
a monitor should only be used where appropriate given the facts
and circumstances of a particular matter.  For example, it may be
appropriate to use a monitor where a company does not have an
effective internal compliance program, or where it needs to estab-
lish necessary internal controls.  Conversely, in a situation where a
company has ceased operations in the area where the criminal mis-
conduct occurred, a monitor may not be necessary.213
There is a significant legal literature on the use of monitors gen-
erally in the context of structural reform litigation and what indepen-
dent monitors can and cannot accomplish.214  The costs of monitors
include the cost of supervision of the company.  They also include the
cost of the monitor substituting its judgment for that of management
and the board in business decision-making.  The threat of the imposi-
tion of monitors may increase the commitment within the firm to
spend resources on increased detection.
210 Id.
211 See Memorandum from Larry D. Thompson, Deputy Att’y Gen., to Heads of
Dep’t Components, U.S. Attorneys, Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business
Organizations (Jan. 20, 2003) [hereinafter Thompson Memo]; Memorandum from
Paul J. McNulty, Deputy Att’y Gen., to Heads of Dep’t Components, U.S. Attorneys,
Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations (Dec. 12, 2006), available
at http://www.justice.gov/dag/speeches/2006/mucnulty_memo.pdf.  One of the ele-
ments behind the McNulty memo was that a corporate culture could be so corrupt as
to need outside assistance to create structural reform of the company’s culture and
address systematic problems.  As the Thompson Memorandum states, “the govern-
ment [should] address and be a force for positive change of corporate culture [and]
alter corporate behavior.”  Thompson Memo, supra.
212 Memorandum from Craig S. Morford, Acting Deputy Att’y Gen., to Heads of
Dep’t Components, U.S. Attorneys, Selection and Use of Monitors in Deferred Prose-
cution Agreements and Non-Prosecution Agreements with Corporations (March 7,
2008), available at http://www.justice.gov/dag/morford-useofmonitorsmemo-0307
2008.pdf.
213 Id. at 2.
214 See Baer, supra note 111; Harry First, Branch Office of the Prosecutor: The New Role
of the Corporation in Business Crime Prosecutions, 89 N.C. L. REV. 23 (2010); Owen M. Fiss,
Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1979); Garrett, supra note 9; Margo
Schlanger, Civil Rights Injunctions Over Time: A Case Study of Jail and Prison Court Orders,
81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 550 (2006).
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The use or threat of use of monitors shifts the cost from govern-
ment enforcers to the firms being monitored.  If there is wrongdoing
that results in the imposition of a corporate monitor, the monitor has
the discretion to utilize significant firm resources to restructure the
firm in a way that creates credible compliance commitments.  How-
ever, this discretion has potential setbacks—what appeared to be rea-
sonable and effective at one moment can turn out to be difficult and
ineffective later on.
Corporate monitors can add costs up to hundreds of millions of
dollars.215  A corporate monitor’s work may include a comprehensive
review of documents and various practices of an organization in order
to take stock of the micro and macro of an organization to determine
how it operates.  Such a review may include reviewing various business
records and correspondence of employees with those outside of the
firm.216  Siemens, since its FCPA violation (resulting in a $800 million
U.S. fine and a similar $800 million fine in Germany),217 has spent
over $100 million on improving its global compliance since 2009,218
with over 600 compliance personnel around the world and $150 mil-
lion spent on outside consultants to address compliance.219
On the discretion of corporate monitors, there are two forces
that pull in different directions.  On the one hand, there is the need
for specific guidance for companies and monitors to understand how
to comply and the limits of what a monitor can and cannot do.  How-
ever, there is also a need for flexibility to tailor a monitorship to the
specifics of a company and its particular organizational environment.
As such, the structure of monitors is highly adapted to the context of
the violation, the company involved, and the prosecutor.220  Moreo-
ver, the adapted role of the monitor has power and adaptability that
antitrust agencies may lack themselves.
The broad powers and discretion have, in some situations,
allowed corporate monitors to become far more active in the internal
governance of a firm than perhaps they should be, as they substitute
215 Kathleen M. Boozang & Simone Handler-Hutchinson, “Monitoring” Corporate
Corruption: DOJ’s Use of Deferred Prosecution Agreements in Health Care, 35 AM. J.L. & MED.
89, 100–01 (2009).
216 See id. at 93–96 (discussing scope and duties of a corporate monitor).
217 Garrett, supra note 6, at 1777.
218 SIEMENS, 2011 ANNUAL REPORT § II, at 74, available at http://www.siemens
.com/annual/11/_pdf/Siemens_AR2011_ReportSB.pdf.
219 See Siemens and an FCPA Compliance Defense, FCPA PROFESSOR (Oct. 10, 2011),
http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/siemens-and-an-fcpa-compliance-defense.
220 Garrett, supra note 9, at 932–33.
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their judgment for management.221  This is perhaps the ultimate
deterrence for cartel members.  Firms will be more likely to invest in
greater compliance ex ante because of the potentially intrusive nature
of corporate monitors ex post.
A monitor places an outsider in a decision-making process within
the firm.  Senior management and directors of companies do not
want to have a monitor to second guess their every decision.  Com-
pounding this fear by managers is that, in some cases, it seems as if in
some non-antitrust contexts there has been insufficient oversight of
corporate monitors by prosecutors and judges.222
The selection of a monitor has presented problems in the non-
antitrust setting.  It is difficult for prosecutors (and judges) to under-
stand the complex organizational practices of a firm and of the crimes
committed therein.223  For this reason, we might assume that prosecu-
tors would impose monitors who have a strong business background,
who understand how compliance works, and who know how to reduce
or eliminate corporate criminality.  Yet, many of the corporate
monitors lack an understanding of the corporate environment.  Many
monitors that have been selected are former prosecutors, government
regulators, or retired judges, rather than people with business experi-
ence.224  Monitors without business experience may not know what
221 See Arlen, supra note 73, at 62–72.
222 See U.S GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-260T, CORPORATE CRIME: PROS-
ECUTORS ADHERED TO GUIDANCE IN SELECTING MONITORS FOR DEFERRED PROSECUTION
AND NON-PROSECUTION AGREEMENTS, BUT DOJ COULD BETTER COMMUNICATE ITS ROLE
IN RESOLVING CONFLICTS 6, 11 (2009); Amy Deen Westbrook, Enthusiastic Enforcement,
Informal Legislation: The Unruly Expansion of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 45 GA. L.
REV. 489, 557-58, 562-63 (2011).  There is no ex post research into the attributes of
successful versus unsuccessful monitorships—are the goals of the monitorship met
and what inputs impact reaching the goals. See, e.g., Mike Koehler, The Facade of FCPA
Enforcement, 41 GEO. J. INT’L L. 907, 959–96 (2010) (noting the shortcomings of
recent FCPA enforcement).
223 First, supra note 214, at 63.
224 U.S GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 222, at 10; Lisa Kern Griffin,
Inside-Out Enforcement, in PROSECUTORS IN THE BOARDROOM, supra note 41, at 110,
1120.  For example, the AIG Monitor examined internal controls regarding financial
reporting and oversaw compliance programs for a total cost of $20 million.  The mon-
itor, longtime Washington lawyer James Cole, performed oversight at exactly the time
that AIG engaged in risky credit default swaps but seemed not to understand its signif-
icance to the company’s long term financial health. See Sue Reisinger, It’s Broken,
LAW.COM CORP. COUNSEL (June 1, 2009), http://www.law.com/corporatecounsel/
PubArticleCC.jsp?id=1202431504805&Its_Broken&slreturn=20130829151356; The
AIG DAG, GOP BLOG (June 28, 2011), http://www.gop.com/news/gop-blog/the-aig-
dag/.  In Cole’s defense, he was limited in the settlement agreement to monitoring
the particular terms of the settlement agreement and not beyond.  F. Joseph Warin et
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programs are effective to implement and may undertake compliance
work that does not improve actual compliance but rather increases
costs in a way that does not maximize shareholder value of the firm.225
III. USE OF CORPORATE MONITORS IN CRIMINAL ANTITRUST
Situations of ineffective compliance and oversight arise in anti-
trust as regularly as in other areas of law.  Yet, if antitrust goes to the
heart of a company’s business, as the DOJ Attorney’s Manual suggests,
one wonders why monitors are used in areas such as bribery, often-
times involving lower-level employees, and not in antitrust, which
involves higher levels of corporate wrongdoing.  This Part will explain
the use of monitors in civil antitrust and advocate that many of the
problems with monitors in other white collar crime apply less in the
antitrust context.
It may well be that a reason that DOJ Antitrust hesitates to use
corporate monitors in the cartel setting is because of the mixed results
with the use of monitors in cases of Sherman Act section 2 claims
involving single-firm conduct and largely because of the anomalous
experience of the Microsoft case.  However, the imposition of antitrust
compliance officers as part of behavioral remedies is common in both
merger and civil Sherman Act section 1 contexts.  This suggests that
antitrust can overcome the problems with corporate criminal
monitors that occur in the FCPA setting.
al., Somebody’s Watching Me: FCPA Monitorships and How They Can Work Better, 13 U. PA.
J. BUS. L. 321, 359 (2011).
225 Nor have monitors been able to fully eliminate recidivism.  There have been a
number of repeat offenders for FCPA enforcement, including ABB Ltd. (2004 and
2010 violations), see Press Release No. 10-1096, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Crim. Div., ABB
Ltd and Two Subsidiaries Resolve Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Investigation and
Will Pay $19 Million in Criminal Penalties (Sept. 29, 2010), available at http://www.jus
tice.gov/opa/pr/2010/September/10-crm-1096.html; SEC Litigation Release No.
18775, SEC v. ABB Ltd., Case No. 1:04CV1141 (July 6, 2004), available at http://www
.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/lr18775.htm; and Baker Hughes (2001 and 2007 viola-
tions), see SEC Litigation Release No. 20094, SEC v. Baker Hughes Inc. and Roy Fear-
nley, Civil Action No. H-07-1408 (April 26, 2007), available at http://www.sec.gov/
litigation/litreleases/2007/lr20094.htm; Order Instituting Public Proceedings Pursu-
ant to Section 21 C of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, In re Baker Hughes Inc.,
SEC Release No. 44784, (September 12, 2001), available at http://www.sec.gov/litiga-
tion/admin/34-44784.htm.  This does not necessarily suggest that the monitor was
ineffective.  Indeed, multinationals have thousands of employees who operate across
countries (with different levels of country corruption and expectations of how busi-
ness is done).  In such circumstances, despite even the best compliance procedures, a
multinational can be subject to liability even if one employee or a small group of
employees acts contrary to the company’s pre-existing procedures.
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A. Why Monitors Are Not Used in Criminal Antitrust More Broadly
If monitors can curb recidivism and reform corporate cultures in
firms, this may assist in criminal antitrust and the leniency program.
If all companies except for the leniency applicant understand that
they will have corporate monitors imposed upon them, this will
increase cartel instability, as it will increase the payoff for a cartel
member to defect via leniency, thereby improving detection.
The Bridgestone plea bargain and the recent AU Optronics and Flor-
ida West cases discussed above in subsection II.B.1 prove that DOJ
Antitrust is aware of the possibility of corporate monitors as a remedy
for cartel activity.  DOJ Antitrust has focused only on leniency and
avoidance of violation.  It has not spent time on building a competi-
tion culture within companies, which puts DOJ Antitrust at odds with
other leading antitrust agencies.226
DOJ Antitrust is reluctant to include monitors as part of its usual
remedy scheme in a criminal cartel setting even though leniency on
its own, while effective at detecting a number of cartels, is less effective
than the leniency program and the additional penalty of monitors at
creating an effective compliance culture that would deter cartel for-
mation in the first instance.  However, it may not be surprising that
DOJ Antitrust would be unwilling to experiment with tweaks to the
leniency program.  Organizational theory notes that, “[o]rganiza-
tional members who have been socialized or trained into a specific
institutional logic are likely to be committed to defending it should it
be challenged.”227
There are less benign explanations than organizational lethargy
in the face of uncertainty that suggest that too much improvement to
the leniency system may weaken the relative standing of DOJ Anti-
trust.  Since the early 1980s, total government antitrust enforcement
has been down significantly relative to levels from the 1950s to
226 See, e.g., COMPETITION BUREAU CANADA, CORPORATE COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS
(2010), available at http://www.competitionbureau.gc.ca/eic/site/cb-bc.nsf/vwapj/
CorporateCompliancePrograms-sept-2010-e.pdf/$FILE/CorporateCompliancePro
grams-sept-2010-e.pdf; OFFICE OF FAIR TRADING, HOW YOUR BUSINESS CAN ACHIEVE
COMPLIANCE WITH COMPETITION LAW (2011).
227 Anne-Claire Pache & Filipe Santos, When Worlds Collide: The Internal Dynamics of
Organizational Responses to Conflicting Institutional Demands, 35 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 455,
460 (2010).  Public choice provides a similar rationale regarding the motivations of
antitrust agencies. See, e.g., D. Daniel Sokol, Antitrust, Institutions, and Merger Control,
17 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1055, 1072–74 (2010); D. Daniel Sokol, Explaining the Impor-
tance of Public Choice for Law, 109 MICH. L. REV. 1029, 1041-48 (2011).
832 notre dame law review [vol. 89:2
1970s.228  This is a function of a number of factors.  One factor is the
shift in procedural case law that makes it more difficult to be a suc-
cessful plaintiff in an antitrust litigation.229  This shift in procedural
antitrust law coincides with a shift in substantive antitrust law that has
moved many parts of antitrust doctrine from per se illegality to a rule
of reason analysis due to a better understanding of antitrust econom-
ics by the courts.230
These shifts in lower total government enforcement mean that
there are fewer “wins” by DOJ Antitrust.  That antitrust should be
viewed in such crude terms as effectiveness being linked to total num-
ber of enforcement actions suggests that there might be a measure-
ment problem as to what the right performance metrics should be.231
The criminal antitrust program is the only area of antitrust that
generates a significant number of “wins.”  In contrast, in merger con-
trol the antitrust agencies received 1166 Hart Scott Rodino merger
notifications in 2010, undertook a second request (serious examina-
tion) in forty-six of those notifications, and the DOJ litigated or settled
via consent decree nineteen cases.232  DOJ Antitrust also litigates a
very small number of civil antitrust cases in any given year.233
A policy shift through the use of monitors would result in closer
to optimal deterrence.  This would mean fewer criminal pleas due to
improved compliance.  Fewer “wins” means a potential loss of funding
228 Barak Orbach & D. Daniel Sokol, Antitrust Energy, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 429, 430
(2012) (“Statistical figures indicate that, since the 1970s, the volume of civil antitrust
litigation is low compared to prior decades.”).
229 See Calkins, supra note 69, at 1119–22; William H. Page, Twombly and Commu-
nication: The Emerging Definition of Concerted Action Under the New Pleading Standards, 5 J.
COMPETITION L. & ECON. 439, 468 (2009) (“The Supreme Court’s decision in Twombly
has imposed a new, more challenging standard of plausibility for alleging agreement
under Section 1 of the Sherman Act.”).
230 See Roger D. Blair & D. Daniel Sokol, The Rule of Reason and the Goals of Anti-
trust: An Economic Approach, 78 ANTITRUST L.J. 471 (2012); Einer Elhauge, Harvard, Not
Chicago: Which Antitrust School Drives Recent U.S. Supreme Court Decisions?, 3 COMPETI-
TION POL’Y INT’L 59 (2007).
231 See Bengt Holmstrom & Paul Milgrom, Multitask Principal—Agent Analyses:
Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design, 7 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 24 (1991); Wil-
liam E. Kovacic et al., How Does Your Competition Agency Measure Up?, 7 EUR. COMPETI-
TION J. 25 (2011).
232 D. Daniel Sokol & James A. Fishkin, Antitrust Merger Efficiencies in the Shadow of
the Law, 64 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 45, 48 (2011); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST
DIV., ANTITRUST DIVISION WORKLOAD STATISTICS, FY 2003–2012 at 5-6, available at
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/workload-statistics.pdf.
233 See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 232, at 5–6.
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for the agency234 and fewer lucrative jobs for antitrust leadership in
the private sector after government service.235
B. Monitors in Antitrust Single Firm Conduct
The most important recent antitrust case that involved dominant
firm conduct and the use of a monitor, Microsoft, is well known and
has been detailed elsewhere.236  This Article therefore briefly discusses
only the issues that emerged in the consent decree governing the rem-
edies of this landmark case that deal specifically with the use of a
monitor.
In the Microsoft saga, the remedy included a monitor to ensure
that Microsoft’s competitors in the application and browser markets
could have equal access to Microsoft’s operating system.237  Judge Kol-
lar-Kotelly set up a monitor to work through technical issues regard-
ing inter-operability and the creation of a protocol licensing
requirement.238 The protocol licensing required Microsoft to make
available communications protocols that Windows client operating
systems used to interoperate with the server operating system of
Microsoft.239
The consent decree imposed a three-person technical committee
of software designers and programmers to oversee this process
through behavioral monitoring.240  The technical committee process
led to a monitoring system that was costly to Microsoft (forty experts
were employed by the technical committee, paid by Microsoft) and
234 WILLIAM A. NISKANEN, JR., BUREAUCRACY AND REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 42
(1971).
235 See Fred S. McChesney & Michael Reksulak, Competition Policy in Public Choice
Perspective, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST ECONOMICS,
supra note 14; Ed deHaan et al., Does the Revolving Door Affect the SEC’s Enforce-
ment Outcomes? (July 2012) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn
.com/abstract=2125560 (discussing how a tough enforcement posture by enforcers
aids in the revolving door in securities).
236 See, e.g., WILLIAM H. PAGE & JOHN E. LOPATKA, THE MICROSOFT CASE (2007);
Harry First & Andrew I. Gavil, Re-Framing Windows: The Durable Meaning of the
Microsoft Antitrust Litigation, 2006 UTAH L. REV. 641.
237 William H. Page & Seldon J. Childers, Measuring Compliance with Compulsory
Licensing Remedies in the American Microsoft Case, 76 ANTITRUST L.J. 239, 239-40 (2009);
see David A. Heiner, Microsoft: A Remedial Success?, 78 ANTITRUST L.J. 329, 334-48
(2012).
238 Page & Childers, supra note 237, at 239.
239 Id. at 240.
240 Second Modified Final Judgment, United States v. Microsoft Corp., No. 98-
1232, at 9–13 (D.D.C. Apr. 22, 2009), available at http://usdoj.gov/atr/cases/
f245100/245110.pdf.
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took on a quasi-regulatory function in its ability to suggest additional
obligations needed for inter-operability.241  The Microsoft decree
lasted for more than ten years.242
The monitor’s work proved to be less than effective.  While there
is more competition today than at the time of the Microsoft settle-
ment, neither DOJ Antitrust nor the court anticipated any of the even-
tual firms that would prove to be serious competitors for Microsoft—
Apple, Google, or Facebook.
There are distinct reasons to explain the limited success of the
Microsoft monitor:
[T]his provision [of the monitor and protocol licensing require-
ment] was problematic from the outset because it did not respond
directly to any proven antitrust violation by Microsoft.  Monopoliza-
tion remedies should usually aim to remove impediments that
proven violations place in the way of entry, innovation, and expan-
sion.  The protocol licensing remedy, by contrast, imposed an
affirmative obligation, essentially unrelated to any proven violations,
to facilitate possible future entry by unknown firms and technolo-
gies.  Many of the problems the court and the parties have encoun-
tered in enforcing the provision can be traced to this high
ambition.243
In other antitrust circumstances involving dominant firm con-
duct, monitors have been more effective.  For example, antitrust has
been active in monitoring the licensing of intellectual property, such
as through the ASCAP244 and BMI245 decrees.  Of note, this monitor-
ing has been done by courts rather than through an in-house moni-
tor.  Nevertheless, the mere threat of judicial rate-setting is enough
for parties to often bargain with each other in the “shadow” of the
law.246
241 Nicholas Economides & Ioannis Lianos, A Critical Appraisal of Remedies in the
E.U. Microsoft Cases, 2010 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 346, 380.
242 See D. Daniel Sokol, The Strategic Use of Public and Private Litigation in Antitrust as
Business Strategy, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 689, 720-25 (2012) (describing the political issues
involved in ending the Microsoft consent decree).
243 Page & Childers, supra note 236, at 241.
244 United States v. Am. Soc’y of Composers, Authors & Publishers, 981 F. Supp.
199 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
245 Broad. Music, Inc. v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
246 Daniel A. Crane, Bargaining in the Shadow of Rate-Setting Courts, 76 ANTITRUST
L.J. 307, 326 (2009).
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C. Monitors in Antitrust Merger Cases
Monitors and conduct remedies seem to be increasingly pre-
ferred in the merger context, in particular for vertical mergers.247
Indeed, there seems to have been a shift within DOJ Antitrust between
the 2004 DOJ Antitrust Remedies Guide and the 2011 DOJ Antitrust
Remedies Guide on this issue.  Whereas the 2004 Remedies Guide
showed more concern that behavioral remedies are “more difficult to
craft, more cumbersome and costly to administer, and easier than a
structural remedy to circumvent,”248 the 2011 Remedies Guide dis-
cusses behavioral remedies as a “valuable tool.”249  Behavioral reme-
dies have been used with increased frequency in the merger context
in cases such as Comcast/NBC Universal 250 and Google/ITA.251
Conduct remedies within the merger context require interven-
tion into the management of firms, which has the potential to raise
administrative costs.252  However, conduct remedies reduce informa-
tion asymmetries that otherwise would exist between the antitrust
agency and the merging parties.253  A conduct remedy that imposes a
monitor embeds the monitor in the merged firm to have better access
to information and to ensure competition.254  The monitor must
ensure that competition that existed before the merger is pre-
served.255  This requires training programs and policing against con-
duct256 that reduces competition through coordination between parts
of the firm that must be kept separate through a firewall.257  In this
sense, the use of antitrust monitors in the merger context is more
similar to what a cartel monitor would do rather than the quasi-regula-
247 But see United States v. George’s Foods, LLC, 76 Fed. Reg. 38,426 (proposed
final judgment June 30, 2011) (using behavioral remedies in the horizontal merger
context).
248 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST DIVISION POLICY GUIDE TO MERGER REMEDIES
7–8 (2004).
249 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST DIVISION POLICY GUIDE TO MERGER REMEDIES
6-7 (2011) [hereinafter MERGER REMEDIES 2011], available at www.justice.gov/atr/pub-
lic/guidelines/272350.pdf.
250 United States v. Comcast Corp., 76 Fed. Reg. 5459, 5461-64 (D.D.C Jan. 31,
2011) (proposed final judgment).
251 United States v. Google Inc., 76 Fed. Reg. 21,026, 21,028-30 (D.D.C. Apr. 14,
2011) (proposed final judgment).
252 See MERGER REMEDIES 2011, supra note 249, at 12–17.
253 See id. at 16.
254 See id. at 12–17.
255 See id. at 15–16.
256 See JOSEPH E. MURPHY, 501 IDEAS FOR YOUR COMPLIANCE AND ETHICS PROGRAM
34, 54 (2008).
257 See MERGER REMEDIES 2011, supra note 249, at 13–14.
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tory function that a monitor would undertake in the monopolization
context.258
It is noteworthy that in an antitrust context, much like the FCPA
context,259 monitors have significant discretion.  The issues that arise
in the context of merger orders tend not to be within the text of the
antitrust laws, so the monitor must ensure that the merged firm is
living up to the terms of the order within the monitor’s discretion.
Yet antitrust monitors have not abused their discretion the way that
FCPA monitors allegedly have.260  This is largely the case because both
DOJ Antitrust and the FTC have compliance offices to work with the
monitors to ensure that the monitors are effective.261
The effective use of monitors in the antitrust merger context also
solves a problem as to effectiveness of monitors in the antitrust crimi-
nal context—monitors are outsiders, appointed by outsiders.262  As
such, they have at least two significant problems.  One, they will find it
hard to get the information they need to be effective.  Two, they will
find it hard to be accepted as legitimate actors, to be taken seriously
by insiders.  The antitrust agencies typically solve the first problem by
picking qualified monitors (unlike like some of the egregious exam-
ples in the FCPA context)263 who understand the right questions to
ask and know where to gather information.  For example, the monitor
in Coca-Cola’s vertical acquisition of its bottler is a former in-house
antitrust and compliance lawyer for Kraft.264  On the second problem,
that of legitimacy,265 sometimes, particularly in a corrupt culture, an
organization needs to bring in someone from the outside precisely
because the insiders are not effective and the organization needs a
cultural change.
258 See supra Sections III.A–III.B.
259 See supra subsection II.B.1.
260 See supra Section II.B.
261 See William J. Kolasky, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Anti-
trust Div., Antitrust Compliance Programs: The Government Perspective (July 12,
2002), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/224389.pdf; Criminal
Enforcement, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/criminal/
index.html (last visited Oct. 21, 2013); Division of Enforcement, FED. TRADE COMM’N,
www.ftc.gov/bcp/bcpenf.shtm (last visited Oct. 21, 2013).
262 Griffin, supra note 224, at 110, 119–22.
263 For discussion on the use of monitors with the FCPA, see supra subsection
II.B.1.
264 See Coca-Cola Co., 150 F.T.C. 10 (2010).
265 See Mark C. Suchman, Managing Legitimacy: Strategic and Institutional Approaches,
20 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 571, 573–77 (1995).
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D. The Curious Case of Criminal Antitrust
Criminal sanctions suggest a more serious problem than civil
sanctions.  Thus, criminal penalties tend to be harsher than civil pen-
alties.  Paradoxically, it is in civil antitrust that corporate monitors
have been imposed rather than in criminal antitrust.  In civil Sherman
Act section 1 cases, the Antitrust Division has imposed corporate
monitors in a number of different types of situations.266  Since the
introduction of the leniency program in 1993, there have been forty
separate civil section 1 cases that involved remedial compliance pro-
grams.  Of these cases, twenty-nine involved the imposition of an “anti-
trust compliance officer” whose role is similar to that of a corporate
monitor, although compliance officers may be someone internal to
the firm.
Two cases provide a representative sample of the structure of civil
final judgments in a section 1 context and the role that the monitor
plays in these settings.  One case involved what is known within anti-
trust merger parlance as “gun jumping.”  In a gun jumping situation,
merging parties integrate before the merger has been finalized.  As a
result of the gun jumping by Gemstar and TV Guide, the two compa-
nies unlawfully fixed prices and allocated markets before the compa-
nies were formally granted clearance to merge.267  The Proposed
Final Judgment entered into by the parties provided for the designa-
tion of a compliance officer to ensure that the gun jumping would not
reoccur in subsequent deals.268
Another case suggests more significant responsibilities for the
antitrust compliance officer.  In a Final Judgment entered into with
the National Association of Realtors (NAR), the DOJ sought to limit
NAR’s policies that restrained competition involving virtual office
websites in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act.269  The Judg-
ment barred NAR from prohibiting or restricting brokers from using
a virtual office for listing information.270  To police the NAR, the
266 See, e.g., Final Judgment, United States v. Nat’l Ass’n of Realtors, No. 05 C
5140, at 2, 5–6 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 18, 2008), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/
cases/f239600/239655.htm.
267 United States v. Gemstar-TV Guide Int’l, Inc., 68 Fed. Reg. 14,996, 14,996
(Antitrust Div., Dep’t of Justice Mar. 27, 2003) (proposed final judgment and compet-
itive impact statement).
268 Id. at 14,998.
269 Final Judgment, United States v. Nat’l Ass’n of Realtors, No. 05 C 5140, at 2,
5–6 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 18, 2008), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/f239600/
239655.htm.
270 Id. at 4–5.
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Judgment provided for an antitrust compliance officer to monitor
NAR and to educate its board members in antitrust compliance.271
On the criminal side, with the exceptions of one set of companies
involved in the same cartel handled out of the Cleveland field
office,272 and the two more recent cases involving AU Optronics and
Florida West,273 the Antitrust Division has almost never imposed
something akin to a corporate monitor or an actual corporate moni-
tor.  The lack of significant use of corporate monitors in antitrust
criminal plea agreements is particularly surprising given the size and
scope of cartel corporate illegality in multinational companies.
E. The Use of Monitors as a Response to Criminal Antitrust Violations
DOJ Antitrust views all compliance programs that result in any
violation, including those leading to a leniency application, as failed
compliance.274  However, by DOJ Antitrust’s own logic, corporate
monitors should be utilized in cartel cases to respond to such “failed”
compliance.  Increasing the penalties and creating the possibility of
monitors raises the stakes for enforcement.  The greater sanctions
may lead to greater deterrence,275 as the fear of detection may make it
less profitable for some firms to participate in price fixing because of
the increased probability of detection internally.  This should deter
some cartels from being formed and provide an incentive for others
to be dissolved.
The reason for the imposition of monitors in criminal antitrust
cases is that, based on the current structure of antitrust enforcement,
there do not seem to be sufficient incentives for firms to implement
effective compliance programs.276  Without detection of wrongdoing
at the individual level, firms benefit from the illegal activity associated
with collusion.277  To counter this, firms and individuals within firms
need incentives to monitor internally and rewards for doing so.278  As
271 Id. at 8.
272 See Plea Agreement, United States v. Premio, Inc., No. CR 06-0086 CRB, at 3–5
(Feb. 22, 2006), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/f215800/215819.htm.
Another two plea agreements involved other companies who were members of the
same cartel.
273 See supra note 192 and accompanying text.
274 See Kolasky, supra note 261.  Arguably, they do think programs that lead to
leniency have worked, at least to a degree, and their reward is eligibility for leniency
by being first to disclose. Id. at 4.
275 See id. at 13.
276 See supra Section I.D.
277 Buccirossi & Spagnolo, supra note 125, at 1231–40.
278 See supra subsection I.E.2.c.
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other articles argue, providing financial rewards for information may
improve cartel detection.279
Firms need to internalize the consequences of breaches of the
law if they are to adopt compliance programs.  Monitors force firms to
internalize these costs.280 Ex ante, firms will invest more in better com-
pliance merely because of the fear of the imposition of the monitor.
This will shift the cost of detection from the government to firms as a
privatization of enforcement.281
Monitors can help change the corporate culture of a firm to
make the culture one of compliance and lawfulness.  Creating an ethi-
cal compliance environment suggests that individuals have internal-
ized the pro-compliance social norm.282  This means that an
individual will factor the social cost of non-compliance into his or her
risk-reward calculation of cartel participation because non-compliance
will be internalized as deviant behavior.283  The individual will also
buy into the values behind a free-market economy and will begin to
see cartel behavior as a form of theft.  This cultural shift toward ethi-
cal compliance aids in whistle blowing on others within the organiza-
tion who commit wrongdoing.284
Employee incentives may not be aligned with the firm in terms of
compliance because an employee or mid-level manager risks losing his
or her job if he or she comes forward with information of illegal activ-
ity.285  Thus, in many cases, the cost of informing outweighs the bene-
fit of remaining silent.  The misalignment of incentives between
employees and the firm replicates itself in the cartel context.  Where
the cartel compliance culture at a firm is weak, there is little incentive
279 See Aubert et al., supra note 59, at 1248–53; Kovacic, supra note 132, at 772;
Christopher R. Leslie, Cartels, Agency Costs, and Finding Virtue in Faithless Agents, 49 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 1621, 1668–69 (2008); Giancarlo Spagnolo, Optimal Leniency Programs
7 (Stockholm Sch. of Econ., FEEM Working Paper No. 42.2000, 2000), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=235092.
280 See supra subsection II.B.3.
281 See supra subsection II.B.3.  I assume that the total amount spent on such priva-
tized enforcement of compliance costs is not suboptimal.
282 See Donald Lange, A Multidimensional Conceptualization of Organizational Corrup-
tion Control, 33 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 710, 720-21 (2008); Charles O’Reilly, III & Jennifer
Chatman, Organizational Commitment and Psychological Attachment: The Effects of Compli-
ance, Identification, and Internalization on Prosocial Behavior, 71 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 492,
493 (1986).
283 See discussion supra subsection I.E.3.
284 See supra subsection I.E.3.
285 See, e.g., Dyck et al., supra note 133, at 2240–45 (examining the incentives and
disincentives for employees to reveal fraud).
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for employees to come forward to report on others within the
organization.
Through more effective use of moral shaming (to which effective,
motivational antitrust compliance training provides enormous aid),
norms can be changed within companies and society at large.286  This
can be done through changing incentives, such as highlighting the
ethical value of compliance, negative media exposure (externally), or
holding management accountable internally for wrongdoing.287
Moral shaming both decreases the cost of detection, because others
will be on the lookout, and raises the potential cost of participation in
illegal activity, because those who might try to engage in illegal activity
will see that it will hurt them, as such behavior will not be tolerated in
the company.
Another element of whistle blowing is that it occurs more often in
organizations where employees feel empowered by their work envi-
ronment (unless there is a financial windfall for the individual for
doing so).288  Social context matters when employees decide to whis-
tle blow or to participate in illegal behavior.289  Some people violate
laws because they do not understand them, rather than because they
actively seek to do so.290  The creation of symbols for what constitutes
bad behavior, and giving such symbols normative and expressive cul-
tural values, affects legal compliance.  Institutional and organizational
forces thereby constrain individual decision-making.291
A corporate monitor may have the support from top manage-
ment (because the monitors may report to the board or to the CEO)
to get information and to get buy-in from various parts of the com-
286 Richman, supra note 49, at 21 (discussing the use of “serious” sentencing in
white collar crimes as a method of deterrence).
287 See Lynn Sharp Paine, Managing for Organizational Integrity, HARV. BUS. REV.,
Mar.–Apr. 1994, at 106–108, 111–12.
288 See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, § 922, 124 Stat. 1376, 1841–49 (2010) (providing whistle blowing incentives).
See generally Janet P. Near et al., Explaining the Whistle-Blowing Process: Suggestions from
Power Theory and Justice Theory, 4 ORG. SCI. 393 (1993) (hypothesizing and finding that
legalistic responses to whistle blowing by organizations have positive effects).
289 See supra subsection I.E.2.c.
290 Diane Vaughan, Rational Choice, Situated Action, and the Social Control of Organi-
zations, 32 L. & SOC’Y REV. 23, 29 (1998).
291 See Lauren B. Edelman & Mark C. Suchman, The Legal Environments of Organiza-
tions, 23 ANN. REV. SOC. 479, 505 (1997) (noting the role that organizations can play
in determining what the law is interpreted as constraining); Vaughan, supra note 290,
at 29–30.  In the corporate context, one way in which law symbolizes such values is to
mandate disclosure of criminal behavior when it is material as part of a company’s
securities filings.
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pany that a pre-existing compliance officer or general counsel of the
company lacked.292  The monitor would work to help the compliance
officer become better integrated into the company, so as to reduce
information asymmetries, and thereby reduce the costs of compliance.
The monitor would help the firm understand the legal regime and
develop a culture, routines, and appropriate incentives that support
compliance with the laws.  A compliance culture also lowers monitor-
ing costs as it allows for early detection of wrongdoing.293  At the back
end, it minimizes penalties because firms (and their agents) are more
likely to detect internal wrongdoing294 and are therefore more likely
to be able to win the race for leniency.295
The focus on the strengths of monitors as a solution should not
suggest that the use of monitors creates no risk.296  The very strength
of the monitor’s discretion creates uncertainty about the nature of
monitor.  With so much discretion, it is possible that the monitor may
blunt pro-competitive steps that a firm might take.  Moreover, the
monitor’s discretion may result in uncertainty about the legal penalty,
either because the penalty that the monitor imposes is weaker than it
should be or because it leads to over-deterrence.297
F. Who Monitors Should Be
In an antitrust criminal setting, a proposed monitor needs to be
someone who has substantive antitrust skills, and, as set forth by DOJ
Antitrust in the AU Optronics sentencing memorandum, has extensive
expertise in developing, implementing, and overseeing antitrust com-
pliance programs.298  This overcomes the problem of a poor choice of
monitors in the FCPA context.299  Someone without an antitrust and
292 See supra Section III.C.
293 See JOSEPH E. MURPHY, A COMPLIANCE & ETHICS PROGRAM ON A DOLLAR A DAY 4
(2010), available at http://www.corporatecompliance.org/Portals/0/PDFs/Resour
ces/ResourceOverview/CEProgramDollarADay-Murphy.pdf.
294 See id.
295 The intricacies of corporate monitors across antitrust regimes for cartel viola-
tions will be left for a future article.
296 However, it seems to be the case that the discount rate for investing in compli-
ance is less than the cost of the monitor.
297 For a similar phenomenon in tort law regarding legal uncertainty, see John E.
Calfee & Richard Craswell, Some Effects of Uncertainty on Compliance with Legal Standards,
70 VA. L. REV. 965, 1000–03 (1984); Richard Craswell & John E. Calfee, Deterrence and
Uncertain Legal Standards, 2 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 279, 298–99 (1986).
298 See Sentencing Memorandum, supra note 192, at 63–64.
299 See Griffin, supra note 224, at 110, 120 (noting that as a political monitor (with-
out expertise in corporate governance), “[f]ormer Attorney General John Ashcroft’s
consulting firm notoriously received up to $52 million for monitoring Zimmer after
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compliance program background will not be well-suited to integrate
antitrust knowledge into the general culture of the company.  Yet,
being an antitrust expert is not enough.  To minimize costs, monitors
should be chosen because they are not only antitrust “experts,” but
also previously worked closely with companies and compliance pro-
grams.  A monitor who has only worked in a law firm or in govern-
ment, without much interaction with the business unit of a firm may
not understand corporate culture and various methods of communi-
cation.  Such monitors may not know how to ask for information or
how to understand a firm’s organizational structures.
This is not to suggest that the only people qualified to serve as
antitrust corporate monitors are former in-house practitioners.  Some
practitioners in law firms or in government know an industry particu-
larly well because of deal flow or litigation within the industry, and
some have had experience with compliance programs.  The more
experience the monitor has, the lower the slope of the learning curve
and the more effective his or her ability will be to positively shape
compliance within a company.  One approach would be for the
appointment to be made by a judge who is presented with perhaps
three alternative monitors and who is also told about any prior or cur-
rent relationships between either the company or the prosecutors and
each of the prospective monitors.300
the U.S. Attorney specified him in the DPA”).  There are two different approaches to
monitoring—one is to make the company hire a mutually agreeable private monitor.
See id. at 119.  The other is to have a branch of the DOJ or some other enforcement
agency do the job and send its own people into the company and charge a fee for the
work. See id. at 119, 121.  The first approach can be expensive and risks having a
monitor who colludes with the company to cover up violations or loose internal con-
trols, see id. at 120–22, or who, in the case of Ashcroft, is simply not well-suited for an
in-house job.  The second approach may mean lower quality monitoring with fewer
resources due to compensation and other constraints on government.  See id. at 119.
Government monitors also probably would have to be walled off from the agency so
they would not report information to the agency that is more appropriately handled
internally at the company.  So far, the private monitor seems to be the preferred
approach even with all of its shortcomings.
300 18 U.S.C. § 208 (2006) would bar a prosecutor from recommending a monitor
with whom the prosecutor is currently negotiating for employment, but this would
cover only a narrow range of conflicts.  18 U.S.C. § 207(a), (c)-(d) would bar a former
senior or very senior official (e.g., John Ashcroft) from communicating with his for-
mer agency with intent to influence on behalf of another person for one to two years,
depending upon the level of seniority, and this might be a disqualifying factor during
this time period.  This also only covers a small percentage of the potential conflicts.
The ACCC booklet on compliance programs has excellent guidance on what
independence means in this context. AUSTRALIAN COMPETITION AND CONSUMER
COMM’N, CORPORATE TRADE PRACTICES COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS (2005).
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G. What Monitors Should Do
The compliance program that a monitor should implement
needs to be tailored to the risks being addressed, the specific organi-
zation, and that organization’s dynamics.301  The monitor must bal-
ance efforts to prevent the repeat of corporate crime in a way that
does not prevent pro-competitive corporate behavior.  This balancing
by the monitor requires a certain amount of discretion.  However,
some sort of guidelines for what effective monitoring might look like
(and more broadly, what might make for effective compliance pro-
grams) would go a long way toward reducing the abuses that seem to
have been not infrequent for corporate monitors in the FCPA
context.302
Tirole describes active monitoring as prospective monitoring, as
opposed to passive monitoring, which is retrospective.303  A compli-
ance monitor should require antitrust interviews with senior and mid-
dle-level management in order to learn the business and to
understand the realities of both the formal and informal organiza-
tional structures of the firm and the key players therein.304  A wise
compliance monitor would also interview more junior-level employ-
ees, including possible “witnesses and helpers,” who may be more can-
did in their descriptions and insights.305  Training should focus on
senior managers and employees who deal with contracts, competitor
benchmarking, trade associations, joint ventures, and pricing and
marketing strategies.306  But it must also include the potential wit-
nesses and helpers who may not lead a cartel, but who would be aware
of suspicious activities.307  This includes low level employees who
301 See Joseph Murphy & William Kolasky, The Role of Anti-Cartel Compliance Pro-
grams in Preventing Cartel Behavior, 26 ANTITRUST 61, 62 (2012).
302 In the government contracts area, there was a change from a voluntary to a
mandatory disclosure regime. Compare Federal Acquisition Regulation, 73 Fed. Reg.
67,064, 67,068–76 (Nov. 12, 2008) (codified at 48 C.F.R. pt. 2, 3, 9, 42, 52) (outlining
the federal mandatory disclosure program), with Letter from William H. Taft, IV,
Deputy Sec’y of Def., to members of the contracting industry (July 24, 1986) in PUBLIC
CONTRACT LAW SECTION ABA, REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON VOLUNTARY DIS-
CLOSURE, Ex. 3 (describing the voluntary disclosure program).
303 Jean Tirole, Corporate Governance, 69 ECONOMETRICA 1, 9 (2001).
304 See Murphy & Kolasky, supra note 301, at 62.
305 See id.
306 AM. BAR. ASS’N, supra note 158, at 80.
307 See Murphy & Kolasky, supra note 301, at 62 (listing the range of steps that
would be expected in “an effective anti-cartel compliance program”).  Most employ-
ees do not blow the whistle on corporate crime. See Dyck et al., supra note 133, at
2213.
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might be aware of wrongdoing but who might otherwise not feel
empowered to do something about it.
A compliance program will only be effective if it changes the cul-
ture and relationships within a firm and alters the incentives for indi-
viduals.  This requires both a desire to change and a sense of what a
company must do to effect such change.308  In many cases, a monitor
needs to focus on the illegal nature of price fixing.  The crime often is
not subtle; the efforts to conceal might themselves be good clues of
bad behavior within the corporation that a pro-compliance culture
should be able to detect.
Without guidance from DOJ Antitrust on what constitutes a good
compliance program, compliance programs have the risk of being
both too expensive and ineffective.309  To better conform compliance
to the particularities of antitrust, as envisaged under the Sentencing
Guidelines, DOJ Antitrust should create guidelines for effective com-
pliance as other antitrust agencies do, and as DOJ Antitrust itself does
for other areas of conduct, including Horizontal Merger Guide-
lines,310 Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Prop-
erty,311 and Antitrust Guidelines for Collaborations Among
308 Recent empirical studies suggest that antitrust compliance programs are not
always effective or up to applicable standards.  A survey of Belgian companies found
that 64% had an antitrust compliance program. GERBEN PAUWELS & JOHAN YSEWYN,
THE IMPACT OF COMPETITION LAW AND COMPLIANCE ON BELGIAN BUSINESSES 2 (2010).
However, the same study found that only 35% of such compliance programs met the
standards of the competition authorities. Id.  In that survey, those companies that are
the most likely to have a compliance program share common traits.  They are: large
companies (more than 1000 employees), subsidiaries of U.S. and Asian companies,
publicly traded, and have confronted an antitrust violation in the past. Id.  Survey
work done in the United Kingdom reveals that the larger the organization, the more
aware its employees are of competition law. OFFICE OF FAIR TRADING, COMPETITION
LAW COMPLIANCE SURVEY ¶ 4.6 (2011), available at http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/
ca-and-cartels/competition-awareness-compliance/oft1270.pdf.  A 2012 survey by the
Society of Corporate Compliance and Ethics reported that 64% of responding compa-
nies did not do antitrust compliance auditing that would meet the “minimum stan-
dards” of the Sentencing Guidelines compliance program standards. See Joe Murphy,
Antitrust Compliance Programs: SCCE’s Survey Says They Are Less Than They Should Be,
CORP. COMPLIANCE INSIGHTS (June 20, 2012), http://www.corporatecompliancein
sights.com/antitrust-compliance-programs-scces-survey-says-they-are-less-than-they-
should-be/.
309 However, an alternate view is that programs do not need to be expensive to be
effective. See MURPHY, supra note 293, at 7.
310 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES
(2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/hmg-2010.pdf.
311 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR THE
LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (1995), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/
public/guidelines/0558.pdf.
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Competitors.312  Indeed, a number of non-U.S. antitrust agencies
offer specific guidance on compliance programs.  These include the
Office of Fair Trading (United Kingdom),313 the Canadian Competi-
tion Bureau,314 Chile’s FNE,315 and the Australian Competition and
Consumer Commission.316
A compliance program should require the creation and effective
use of an antitrust manual and a clear statement of the company’s
compliance commitment.317  This is in line with the Sentencing
Guidelines, which discuss “reasonable steps to communicate . . . in a
practical manner . . . by conducting effective training programs and
otherwise disseminating information.”318  Creating a narrow, tailored
set of compliance guidelines and following them would not only help
corporate monitors in achieving very specific and circumscribed goals,
but this also would allow companies to benefit from taking on the cost
of significant compliance because of the benefits received from early
detection of wrongdoing.
Improved compliance programs also better allow for communica-
tion with enforcers about potential wrongdoing.  Better compliance
programs would therefore lead to better detection should there be a
bad apple that veers from the good corporate culture in spite of
incentives that should push for compliance.
One role of the monitor would be to create a long-term mecha-
nism to better integrate the general counsel’s office into the senior-
level management decision-making, where the worst cartels seem to
develop.319  This can arise from helping the legal team to become bet-
ter linked to the business unit as a provider of strategic advice.
312 FED. TRADE COMM’N & U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR COL-
LABORATIONS AMONG COMPETITORS (2000), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/
04/ftcdojguidelines.pdf.
313 OFFICE OF FAIR TRADING, supra note 226.
314 COMPETITION BUREAU CANADA, supra note 226.
315 FISCALI´A NACIONAL ECONO´MICA [FNE] [NATIONAL ECONOMIC ATTORNEY GEN-
ERAL’S OFFICE], PROGRAMAS DE CUMPLIMIENTO DE LA NORMATIVA DE LIBRE COM-
PETENCIA [COMPETITION COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS COMPLYING WITH COMPETITION LAW]
(2012), available at http://www.fne.gob.cl/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/Programas-
de-Cumplimiento.pdf, translation available at http://www.compliance-network.com/
wp-content/uploads/2012/10/Chiles-Compliance-Program.pdf.
316 AUSTRALIAN COMPETITION AND CONSUMER COMM’N, supra note 300.
317 See MURPHY, supra note 256, at 44–45.  Within the structure of such standards
as the Sentencing Guidelines, there are many different types of elements a company
can add into its program. See generally id. (outlining ideas for compliance programs
under categories such as training, discipline, and risk assessments).
318 U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 2012 USSC GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8B2.1(b)(4)(A).
319 See discussion supra subsection I.E.3.a.
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Another crucial function is to ensure that the chief ethics and compli-
ance officer has appropriate independence and empowerment.  As
the Canadian Competition Bureau astutely noted: “[T]he person or
group responsible for compliance must be in a position to act effec-
tively, in that there is independence, professionalism, empowerment,
financial support and a solid understanding of what is taking place
within the business.”320  Important elements in such positioning are to
have the compliance officer both report to an independent commit-
tee of the board and be removable only by the board.
As in other compliance risk areas, it is also important that the
subject matter expert, the antitrust lawyer, works closely with the com-
pliance officer so that there is a seamless approach to antitrust compli-
ance.  If antitrust compliance is left to the corporate compliance
officer, this might be problematic.  Bifurcating compliance between a
compliance office and a general counsel’s office might mean that
some compliance programs are more likely to be rewarded than
others.  The lack of coordination between compliance and legal teams
may mean that while there is emphasis on preventing and detecting
accounting fraud, it may come at the expense of financial support for
cartel-related compliance monitoring and training.321
320 COMPETITION BUREAU CANADA, supra note 226, at 6.
321 To properly effectuate antitrust compliance, monitors should ensure that the
company has measures such as a code of conduct, training sessions for employees,
and a fully empowered compliance officer whose scope includes antitrust and train-
ing programs for managers and staff.  Creating an effective compliance structure
requires creating a way to properly collect and analyze information.  The monitor
should also conduct an antitrust risk analysis to provide a diagnostic of antitrust risk.
See Donald I. Baker & Mary J. Houle, Using the Results of an Antitrust Audit to Educate the
Corporate Team, 59 ANTITRUST L.J. 971, 981 (1991) (describing the beneficial uses of an
antitrust audit). But see Joseph E. Murphy, Surviving the Antitrust Compliance Audit, 59
ANTITRUST L.J. 953, 953–54, 969–70 (1991) (suggesting some downsides to the anti-
trust audit).  Monitors might want to adjust the pay incentive structure of a company
or ensure that the compliance officer is positioned on an ongoing basis to do this.
The nature of managerial contracts may impact the likelihood of a manager under-
taking collusive activities.  Incentives can be structured in such a way that decreases
the likelihood of a manager engaging in collusion. See Giancarlo Spagnolo, Manage-
rial Incentives and Collusive Behavior, 49 EUR. ECON. REV. 1501, 1515–16 (2005) (detail-
ing the effects that different managerial incentives have on the presence of
collusion).  It is important that, as part of the compliance program, the compliance
function be given continuing budgetary support.  Moreover, the compliance program
must be regularly reviewed.  Changes in marketing or sales should trigger an antitrust
review of the proposed strategy for the likelihood of coordinated behavior.  One job
of the monitor would be to identify staff (by risk profile) for additional monitoring
and training.  A member of the company who meets with competitors, such as at trade
association meetings, may be more at risk to participate in cartel activity than others
in an organization.  Riley & Bloom, supra note 157, at 28, 30, 34, 37.  Antitrust
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One could create specific individual incentives for a monitor to
adequately assure compliance.  One of these incentives could be a cer-
tification letter for inclusion in the company’s 10K, stating what the
monitor has done to assure compliance and that, to the best of the
monitor’s knowledge, the company is in compliance with the law.
Such an assurance letter could give rise to liability under the securities
laws if it is knowingly or recklessly incorrect.  In addition, one might
require a “conditional fee” as an incentive mechanism.322  Non-com-
pliance would mean no fee for the monitor and “disgorge[ment]” of
“fees paid during the period of noncompliance.”323  Analogously, if
parents come home and find the TV on, popcorn all over the floor,
and the kids’ homework still in their backpacks, the babysitter (corpo-
rate monitor) does not get paid.  These conditional fees might also be
worked into management contracts so that management also contin-
ues to be responsible for long-term maximization of compliance.
Creating effective incentives for the monitor is as difficult as cre-
ating effective incentives for executives.  The design problem is diffi-
cult because the optimal mix of sanctions and benefits for a monitor
doing his or her job is not always clear.  If a monitor is paid merely a
salary, it might lead to short-term fixes at the company, or the monitor
might sacrifice short-term fixes for long-term structural changes that
are not easy to measure.  Yet, stock-based incentives for a monitor
might cause the monitor to sacrifice quality of oversight for short-term
profit, which is exactly why the monitor was imposed upon the firm in
the first place.
CONCLUSION
The U.S. criminal antitrust system is not broken.  Overall, leni-
ency has been the most impressive innovation in antitrust enforce-
ment in the last quarter century.  However, the traditional penalty
formulation of fines and criminal sanctions seems to be reaching its
limit to get closer to optimal deterrence.  This Article proposes modi-
fications to both the benefits and punishments associated with leni-
monitors and compliance officers also should run econometric screens. See generally
Rosa M. Abrantes-Metz et al., Enhancing Compliance Programs Through Antitrust Screen-
ing, 4.5 ANTITRUST COUNS. 4 (2010) (applying screening techniques to compliance
programs); Rosa Abrantes-Metz & Patrick Bajari, Screens for Conspiracies and Their Mul-
tiple Applications, 24 ANTITRUST 66 (2009) (providing an overview of the screening
process).
322 See Claire Hill & Richard Painter, Of the Conditional Fee as a Response to Lawyers,
Bankers and Loopholes, 1 AM. U. BUS. L. REV. 42, 50–55 (2011) (advocating for and
describing a conditional fee system).
323 Id. at 51.
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ency in order to improve detection.  On the benefits side, leniency
should be more generous—but only for the amnesty applicant and
only if the applicant has an effective compliance system, as the U.S.
Sentencing Guidelines contemplate.  On the punishment side, cartels
need stronger punishments in the form of mandatory imposition of
an antitrust corporate monitor for firms other than the leniency appli-
cant.  This will create better incentives for some firms to invest ex ante
in better internal detection.
Corporate monitors create fear among boards of directors and
executives because of the discretion that they have to oversee a com-
pany and push changes that may have a significant impact on a com-
pany’s operations and structure.  Because the time that monitors
spend at firms is limited in duration, there is a low risk of monitor
capture.  One reason to promote corporate monitors and better inter-
nal governance in a cartel setting may be that such policies can substi-
tute for higher criminal sanctions as part of the optimal deterrence
trade-off that firms make.  Without some other mechanism to increase
the cost of illegality (because of limits to fines and incarceration for
cartel crimes), it would be rational for firms and individuals therein to
participate in cartel activity.
These additional rewards for leniency and punishments through
the imposition of a monitor will not eliminate cartel formation and
participation.  At whatever penalty level the legal regime sets fines and
jail time, there will always be some groups of people for whom no
amount of penalties will matter because such people convince them-
selves that they will never get caught.324  However, reduced penalties
for the leniency applicant and the automatic imposition of corporate
monitors upon other members of a cartel will bring cartel policy
closer to optimal deterrence than the current regime, without adding
significant administrative costs, through better incentives for internal
detection.
324 Sokol, supra note 12, at 230–31 (providing survey evidence of antitrust lawyers
on the behavior of cartel clients).
